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Transnational Activism in Lebanon’s Women’s 
Movement: Between Fitna, Fawda, and Feminism 
 
Sandy S. El Hage 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates transnational campaigns from the international and 
state level to consider the existence of transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. Lebanon’s women’s movement serves as an example to analyze the 
effects of transnationalism on national campaigns for policy change, in the Lebanese 
case, reformed personal status laws and citizenship rights. The study follows the 
literature on Lebanon’s women’s movement to extend an analysis of systemic effects 
on the structure of women’s organizing with emphasis on international partnerships in 
state-centered contention during the country’s post-war development. Pressure for 
greater recognition and observance of women’s human rights has risen as a pertinent 
feature of civil society as Lebanon has become further enmeshed in international 
partnerships and U.N. agencies. As a result, the structure of the women’s movement 
has transformed from a loose network of women’s advocacy groups to a centralized, 
top-down movement. The focus of this case study investigates the spur of a bottom-
up, grassroots feminist movement as a response to top-down contention and 
cooptation of women’s organizing by a UN-Lebanon alliance through the UNFPA 
and National Commission for Lebanese Women. With focus on grassroots organizing 
and diffusion of feminist discourse, the case study of Nasawiya provides a contrast 
between transnational activism in women’s organizing across ideology and structure. 
Still, Lebanon’s women’s movements reveals old truths of the country’s sectarian 
political system: women’s organizing continues to suffer at the hands of patriarchal 
politics. Nonetheless, the emergence of a grassroots, feminist polity suggests that, as 
the “mainstream” women’s movement has become less fragmented and 
institutionalized, the “alternative” feminist movement has also increased in activism 
and visibility, thus implying a new schism in Lebanon’s women’s movement. 
 
Keywords: Women’s Movement, Transnational Activism, Transnational Feminism, 
Grassroots Organizing, Feminist International Relations Theory  
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CHAPTER ONE 
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL GRIEVANCES IN LEBANON 
 
1.1 – Situating the Thesis 
“I have a feeling that our time has come. We, the people on the margins. The angry, 
disenfranchised people who pay too much for bread and fuel and rent and water and parking. 
We, the kids who grew up in the 80s. We, who are unamused by boring media and mindless 
entertainment. We, who’ve been struggling for years trying to create small, important 
projects that go nowhere and achieve nothing. Civil marriage. Women’s rights. Green spaces. 
Anti-corruption. Renewable energy. Equal pay. Migrant rights. Bicycle lanes. Refugee rights. 
Public schools. Public universities. Social security. Protect our beaches. Protect our workers. 
Protect our Internet. Protect love. Save our animals. Save our forests. Save our heritage. End 
torture. End the civil war. Build a public transportation system that works already! 
How much longer are we supposed to fight – alone and secluded – for what is right? 
How much longer do we bang our heads against a Parliament that doesn’t give a damn? 
Over 300 laws they have in their drawers and they waste their time – time that we pay for 
with our sweat and hard work – to quarrel over issues that don’t even concern us. Better yet, 
they create issues and convince us that they are protecting us from each other. Who protects 
us from the daily struggle it takes to live in this country that millions of us have abandoned 
because it gets [sic] more and more unbearable every day. I have a feeling that thousands of 
you agree that enough is enough. And what’s different this time is that I have a feeling 
thousands of you want to do something about it. What better thing to do than take back 
Parliament?” 
 
—Nadine Moawad 
 
Nadine Moawad’s blog post from April 4, 2012 has reverberated throughout 
Lebanon’s active blogosphere from social media outlets, Twitter, Facebook, and not 
to mention at her own blog, www.nadinemoawad.com. Titled, “I have a feeling our 
time has come,” Moawad’s tone at first reads as an almost too quixotic declaration. 
However, after an exhilarating first read, a second study reveals that Moawad, a 
widely revered activist in Lebanon’s feminist collective, Nasawiya, suggests a clearly 
articulated dissatisfaction with the status quo.  
Further, and more suggestive are the grievances delineated in Moawad’s 
statement and a call to “Take back Parliament.” Moawad’s activism to challenge 
complacency and instigate a social movement is at the core of Lebanon’s feminist 
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collective, Nasawiya. Since 2010, feminist in Lebanon have been organizing towards 
a larger social movement among Lebanon’s grassroots community. The structure, 
rhetoric, and campaigns within this very social movement are characterized as 
grounded in a feminist framework and “alternative” in their approaches to existing 
women’s organizations in Lebanon.  
An influx of NGOs and transnational networks for women’s organizing and 
the use of social media during the preparation phase of protests have contributed to 
the changed structure in Lebanon’s women’s movement. However, a great aspect of 
the movement’s emerging character can also be attributed to the intervening variables 
of internationalism and the purview of globalization on Lebanon’s political and 
economic opportunities for increasing women’s rights.  
An analysis of the women’s movement in Lebanon provides an insightful 
overview of the transnational diffusion of liberal feminist values through generations 
and across cultural boundaries. This paper asserts that, due to the sectarian political 
structure in Lebanon, the women’s movement has been historically fragmented (Bray-
Collins 2003; Weber 2003; Khattab 2010). However, this study is a departure from 
the existing literature on Lebanon’s women’s movement in that it situates the 
women’s movement from the domestic sphere to the international arena. Amongst the 
abundance of literature, Harb (2010) lightly considers transnational activism through 
transnational advocacy networks in Lebanon’s women’s movement. However, the 
mention of transnational advocacy networks is depicted in broad strokes, where such 
networks are described to “play an important role in reducing repression in various 
countries by supplying information, socializing agents in a world culture, and using 
economic pressure.”1  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Harb, 2010, p. 18 
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This study focuses on the transnational structures wherein underlie the 
mechanisms of women’s organizing. Upon investigation in the linking process of 
Lebanon’s women’s movement, or according to Sidney Tarrow (2005), “how local 
activists cognitively connect to global symbols,”2 activism is notably transnational in 
its political opportunity structure and grievances. Linkage occurs through various 
process instigated by activists seeking to side-step national contention, or namely in 
Lebanon this process emerges as a result of an unresponsive government and 
languished national policies for women’s rights. This process, as Tarrow identifies, is 
the initial domestic process within a transnational social movement.3 In Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, linkage, or the linking process, to a transnational force serves as 
the identifying marker of transnational activism. Leading to the characterization of 
feminist activism as the linking process, the paper constructs a two-fold analysis of 
the women’s movement to broadly consider the structural effects on agency. First it 
seeks to examine the systemic variables that cultivate structural inconsistencies in the 
women’s movement in Lebanon. From this analysis, a discourse of international-
nation-state contentious politics will emerge to consider the pervasive effects of 
neoliberalism on institutionalizing the women’s movement. A second analysis will 
characterize the existence of transnational activism as a product of diffused liberal 
feminist values that have allowed efflorescence of transnational feminist activism. 
The implications of international contentious politics and transnational activism in 
Lebanon’s women’s movement will further elucidate on the magnitude international 
politics, and particularly U.N. policies clash with feminist values in Lebanon. The 
discrepancy between U.N. campaigns for women’s rights and the aspirations of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Tarrow, 2005, p. 60 
3 Tarrow, 2005, p. 60 
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feminist activism for women’s rights organizing in Lebanon’s domestic politics make 
up the fabric of transnational contention in Lebanon’s emerging feminist movement.  
In addressing the juncture of international contentious politics and 
domestically rooted transnational activism, I focus primarily on the displacement of 
policy oversight for women’s human rights from the state to United Nations agencies. 
These efforts highlight attempts to institute Western-style liberties for women. 
This thesis attempts to identify transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement with a study of Nasawiya, a Feminist Collective of activists in Lebanon. A 
progeny from social movement theory, transnational activism discerns the character 
of activism in Lebanon’s contemporary women’s movement as a projection of 
international contentious politics for women’s rights. Upon further investigation, this 
study identifies a correlation between state-centered politics, the ineffectual inclusive 
political opportunity structure in Lebanon, the implications of supranational relations 
with Lebanon’s civil society, and the emergence of a progressive social movement for 
a feminist, secular polity.  
However, in its infancy, Lebanon’s Feminist Collective Nasawiya faces 
obstacles to mobilizing for political awareness beyond social media forums and 
protest spheres. In its campaign for women’s rights in Lebanon, the Feminist 
Collective faces opposition from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is 
the representative body for fifty-seven member states, including Lebanon, at the 
United Nations Population Fund, “the leader in reproductive health and population 
and development”. Aside from its alternative discourse for a feminist polity, activists 
in Nasawiya express disdain against the state of Lebanon. Activists express a struggle 
against patriarchy and an expressed desire to gain recognition as a legitimate 
representative body in the women’s movement.  
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A concluding analysis will delineate the existing constraints of Lebanon’s 
sectarian political structure on transnational feminist activism. The case of patriarchal 
representatives on behalf of Lebanese in the UNFPA and Lebanon’s parliament, that 
which aims to structure its human rights policies in accordance to U.N. criteria, serves 
as the primary intersection of contention between national and international discourse 
for policies on women’s issues. From here, the crux of state contention has emerged 
from refusal to ratify U.N. policies (under the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW) for women’s rights, where 
certain articles have been deemed as defiant to prevailing political, cultural, and 
religious norms. In response to contention between the OIC and the UNFPA, the 
Lebanese state has been complacent towards the former organization.  
The implicit argument addressed in this thesis argues, as long as patriarchal 
features of the Lebanese sectarian system are not addressed, the issue of gendered 
politics among elite decision-makers will persist at the national and international 
level, even when there are transnational grassroots pressures seeking to reform the 
system.  
 
1.2 – The Topic of the Present Women’s Movement in Lebanon 
On the cusp of Lebanon’s last parliamentary elections in 2009, Al Jazeera 
English aired a news segment on the dismal participation of women in Lebanese 
politics. In his newscast, Todd Baer posed the overwrought and contrived stereotype 
that “Lebanon is widely regarded as one of the most open societies for women in the 
Arab world”. However, Baer admits what activists of Lebanon’s women’s movement 
have been challenging, that, “What you see on the street does not transcend into the 
political arena.”  
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In 2009 “of the more than five-hundred candidates running for a seat here in 
the Lebanese parliament, only twelve of them [were] women and judging from 
previous election results, it [was] unexpected that even half of them will make it.” A 
post mortem of the 2009 parliamentary elections indeed reflects a reality of inequality 
in decision-making. Results were staggering low, with only four women elected from 
a bracket of 128 to be Members of Lebanon’s 2009-2013 parliament.  
  Baer’s report further provided two opposing interpretations for women’s lack 
of political involvement. Paul Salem, head of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Beirut, says it is easy to understand why women do not 
transcend these political boundaries, because “maybe…the lifestyle of the Lebanese, 
you know, they would prefer to have a good time, have a good job, drive a nice car 
rather than get engaged in politics.”4 Bahia Hariri, a veteran politician, posed perhaps 
a more cerebral deduction that “among the reasons for the low numbers of women in 
politics…is that the Lebanese political system is mainly controlled by prominent 
families where men are expected to lead.”5  
From Hariri’s assertions, this thesis is concerned with assessing the 
mechanisms of Lebanon’s women’s movement for overcoming a lack of 
responsiveness from the confessional, male-dominated government. In 2012, it is 
apparent the women’s movement has incurred setbacks, despite Lebanon having 
reinstated a stable political structure in accordance to the 2008 Doha Agreement.  
Though my framework is largely concerned with theories of social movements 
and the emergence of new features in Lebanon’s feminist activism and women’s 
movement, the social grievances among activists are direct products of a stagnant, 
patriarchal decision-making system. Particularly, feminist activists are trying to afford !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Baer, T. (Executive Producer). (2009, May 29). Al Jazeera English. Doha, Qatar. Retrieved from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sIGmmuK1OzM 
5 Baer, 2009  
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their owns means to erect a gender-sensitive, egalitarian, inclusive political culture for 
a genuinely democratic republic in Lebanon. 
Budding scholars and academics alike have extensively discussed the status of 
women in Lebanon. Prime research conducted from between post-Ta’ef Accord and 
pre-2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel highlights nation-state contention in the 
women’s movement and the patriarchal Lebanese state. Accordingly, involvement of 
women in decision-making and political leadership positions has continued to remain 
at distressingly low numbers throughout Lebanon’s development stage post-1990.  
For women and politics the world has stood still since as far back as 1953, 
when suffrage was extended to female Lebanese citizens; to date, only seventeen 
women have served in parliament. Personal status laws continue to be gendered and 
“relegated to the authority of patriarchal religious courts and institutions…Thus, the 
freedom Lebanese women enjoy is selective.”6 A ‘Western’ feminist scholar wrote 
the aforementioned statement in a thesis on the gendered politics of elite decision-
makers in Lebanon. Nine years later, Bray-Collins’s statement still evokes a wretched 
truth about women’s rights in Lebanon, especially towards gender rights or the 
acknowledgement of gender mainstreaming.  
In its development stage post-1975-1990 Civil War, and post-2006 July War 
between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanon has endured an everlasting, turbulent political 
climate. Existing political parties, “especially after the civil war from 1975 to 
1990…compete to preserve narrow sectarian interests, not those of a unified 
Lebanon.”7 The political system is thus not only a stalwart patriarchal one, but rigid at 
that, with primary concerns that revolve around party politics. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Bray-Collins, 2003, p. 2 
7 Khalife, N. (2009, June 2). A women’s place, in Lebanon. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/02/womans-place-lebanon 
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Today, and as the 2013 parliamentary elections inch closer, feminist activists 
and the women’s movement are enacting strides towards achieving greater women’s 
rights, or political parity at the least. Since the 2010 submission of a draft law by 
KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation (KAFA) to protect women from family 
violence, grassroots movements have taken the streets in numerous protests to 
pressure an unresponsive government for acknowledgment that the personal is indeed 
political.  
Of the first of many large protests, on January 14, 2012, a fledgling women’s 
movement marched through the maze of Beirut’s most politically active 
neighborhood to pressure the Lebanese government to consider a draft law written by 
lawmakers and activists of the women’s movement. In this assembly of protestors, a 
collective force moved in synergy to demonstrate against sexual violence in Lebanon, 
birth country to most of the protestors present, and chiefly a country insufficiently 
governed by a malnourished judiciary that is unable to allocate rights cultivated in 
most democratic systems.8 
From the Interior Ministry to the doorstep of Lebanon’s Parliament, the march 
was principally characterized by a movement of non-state actors against the backdrop 
of state contention. Nonetheless, the march itself was symbolic of the growing 
support for Lebanon’s women’s movement throughout the wider sphere of civil 
society.   
The foundation for Lebanon’s women’s rights movement is the result of 
dynamic turmoil of structural factors against a heightened wave of grassroots 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Article C of Lebanon’s Constitution’s Preamble states, “Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic 
republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect 
for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination” 
(Armstrong, M. (2012, June 14). More Lebanese opting for civil marriage abroad. The  
Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-14/176772-more-
lebanese-opting-for-civil-marriage-abroad.ashx#axzz1xaiVXicw) 
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campaigns and transnational activism. The country’s unheeding cultural patriarchy, a 
resultant political segregation from sectarianism, and a fractured economy 
unsupported by laws that protect women in the workplace contribute to the complex 
environment through which women’s movement in Lebanon has had to maneuver. 
Most important, these factors have also contributed to the unification of grievances of 
gender inequality and oppression on women. 
This single demonstration generated up to a thousand protestors from across 
the Lebanese regions, and would maintain as, thus far, Lebanon’s largest 
demonstration for women’s rights of 2012.9 The guise of this protest presented a 
demand to reconcile the gap between archaic, hallow, and mostly nonexistent laws 
towards family violence, marital rape, and sexual harassment in the workplace—
offenses that heed direct gender discriminations towards women. Over the course of 
five months, and since the January 14th protest, the women’s movement in Lebanon 
has also sought to elucidate on the overhanging social issues at large, the indirect 
gender discriminations that have resulted in gendered leadership and patriarchal 
political representation.10  
Unlike recent social movements across the Middle East and North Africa, 
namely in Egypt, supporters of women’s rights rightfully came out that Saturday with 
confidence that, although Lebanon’s unstable social environment has been prone to 
disparaging equal rights of demographics aligned with contentious political or social 
affiliations, their freedom of speech was protected under an authorized permit to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Under the conduct of up to 30 NGOs, Lebanon’s activists and women’s movement has staged and 
partaken in six protests since January 13, 2012 to pressure  (personal observation from January 13, 
2012 to May 12, 2012).   
10 There are no women in decision-making positions in Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s thirty-person 
governing cabinet (El-Basha, Thomas. (2011, June 13). Mikati forms 30-member Lebanon cabinet. The  
Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/2011/Jun-13/Lebanon-appoints-new-
government.ashx#axzz1uUTsZ0yz) 
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occupy streets in the Sanayeh district of Beirut, though under strict parameters.11 That 
day women and men demonstrated without any political party affiliations. Rather, a 
community of non-governmental organizations served as a mobilizing structure. The 
rhetoric of freedom of speech, however, stood as an elusive right. Though 
constitutional rights account for the freedom to assemble in Lebanon, recent history of 
protests across the Middle East and North Africa region has been a prism of reality to 
remind protestors that violation against personal freedoms is always a possible 
outcome.  
The urgency expelled by activists from the widespread protest on January 14th 
permeated onto the agenda of decision-makers in parliament. Since its consideration, 
however, the draft law has been revised with severe distortions by erasing its gender 
undertone. Originally in 2010, KAFA, a prominent NGO human rights organization, 
submitted the draft proposal under the heading of “Protecting Women from Family 
Violence.” As of 2012, the impending bill has been renamed to “Protecting the Entire 
Family” whilst a vital clause that extends protection against marital rape continues to 
be scrutinized in the parliamentary debate chamber.12  
Head of the subcommittee, Members of parliament, and Tripoli MP Samir Jisr 
clarified that the bill will not achieve legislation until it follows a framework “in line 
with the Constitution, Lebanese Law and international agreements, especially the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.”13 
The process through 2010 and on in creating a gender-based law for women’s 
rights has proven to Lebanon’s women’s movement that, not only is the decision-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 According to a UNDP report, Lebanon grants the freedom of assembly under Article 13 of its 
constitution, however within “the limits of law” (“Internal Governance for Governance in Lebanon,” 
2004).  
12 Gatten, E. (2012a, March 7). Compromise over key clauses in domestic violence draft law to be 
reached soon. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Mar-
07/165818-compro...-domestic-violence-draft-law-to-be-reached-soon.ashx#axzz1xaiVXicw 
13 Gatten, 2012a 
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making body in Lebanon patriarchal, the nuance relationship between women’s rights 
and human rights is nonexistent in political rhetoric and Lebanon’s political 
discourse. Therefore, superseding and excluding gendered politics from discourse 
altogether.  
This study will build upon existing literature of social movement theory, 
feminist critique, and civil society and democratization in Lebanon to consider the 
implication of transnational feminist activism in Lebanon’s women’s movement. 
However, this thesis will diverge from past arguments that have eloquently presented 
critiques of civil society and stagnant democratization in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement to, rather, consider Lebanon’s affluent civil society as a variable to 
opening the current political opportunity structure that which transnational feminist 
activists are mobilizing through.  
Thus, the overarching thesis question of this study beckons consideration of 
systemic effects that have widely shaped the structure of Lebanon’s women’s 
movement.  
 
1.3 – Outline of the Thesis 
To explain factors affecting the contemporary character of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, Chapter Two will introduce the theoretical framework of 
transnational activism as a phenomenon that occurs in Lebanon from top-down and 
bottom-up initiatives in the women’s movement. Chapter Three will introduce 
literature on transnational feminist activism as a manifestation to counter systemic 
patriarchal decision-making.  In Chapter Four, the study will delve into the 
opportunity structures that have enabled transnational activism to transform the way 
women’s organizations from civic society began to organize in a unilateral manner 
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within a statist alignment with the national women’s organization, National 
Commission for Lebanese Women.  The pitfalls to transnationalism are described as 
two-fold. On one side there is the reigning political system, behind the cooptation of 
the women’s movement, and is described as patriarchal in structure and political 
values. This political character is survived by the dominance of men within the 
governing system, and has egregiously disregarded women’s organizations and 
campaigns for reformed personal status laws. The overwhelming representation of 
men has further led to a bulwark of patrilineal policies. And in a symbiotic manner, 
these factors continue to breed state level contention between women’s rights 
campaigns and the Lebanese state. 
The other side of contentious politics in Lebanon’s women’s movement is an 
intrinsic problem of how women’s organizations and activists organize to pressure the 
Lebanese state. While there are instances where women’s organizations have 
participated in intersectional campaigns, groups have failed to mobilize a unified 
women’s movement. Instead, the movement has been fragmented and weakened by 
long, stagnant periods of no reform following costly campaigns and disagreement 
between women’s organization leaders on how to best achieve movement goals. Yet, 
regardless of which side of the argument is presented, the conclusion will revert back 
to a known truth: Lebanon’s women’s movement continues to be coopted by ruling 
elites.  
Khattab (2010) provides this assertion in an analysis of long-standing 
women’s organizations, wherein Khattab’s thesis argues that polarization in 
Lebanon’s women’s movement is a prominent feature, and at this rate a “counter-
hegemonic society” has not materialized to challenge the prevailing political order.14    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Khattab, 2010 
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Chapter Five will follow with a detailed account of grassroots transnational 
activism from below. This chapter will focus solely on the emergence of Nasawiya as 
a transnational feminist social movement. The study of Nasawiya will posit an 
example of a grassroots movement attempting to build a “counter-hegemonic 
movement,” and thus debunk Khattab’s assertion that Lebanon’s women’s movement 
is solely a product of a complacent civil society.  While the subject of this thesis is 
largely an exploratory study of feministic social movement organizing in Lebanon, 
there is a larger implication to bringing the state back into analysis vis-à-vis social 
movement contention.  
Where Chapter One introduced grievances expressed in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement, the proceeding chapter expands upon the methodological approach used to 
address qualitative variables that govern the behavior of a feminist movement in 
Lebanon’s women’s movement. The case of study of Lebanon’s women’s movement 
will satisfy a dual component to answering the thesis and its subsequent question.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
2.1 – Introduction 
The general purpose of the thesis is to describe the character, nature, and 
pervasive phenomenon of transnational activism. Lebanon’s women’s movement is a 
case study from which to draw informed assertions of the existence of transnational 
activism in Lebanon.  
The subsequent sections will outline the theoretical underpinnings of the 
thesis. A great emphasis is placed on the significance of the role of the participant-
observer as part of a holistic approach in the tradition of feminist scholarship. An 
aspiration of this study is to integrate a feminist ideology into International Relations 
and Social Movement scholarship. 
 
2.2 – Configuring a Methodology 
This study is an endeavor to provide a modest contribution for reading 
discursive arguments on civil society actors and activism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. It will fundamentally serve as a critique that extends far from a personal 
exercise in situating academic scholarship, and aims to employ a new perspective 
from which to observe activism on a transnational plane in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement.  
From a personal level, as a student and researcher, my immediate academic 
environment in Lebanon has provided an incentive for me to study feminist discourse. 
For one, when class discussions were dominated by the monotony of liberal and 
 15 
realist theories of International Relations, it was the least mentioned theory in IR that 
found my interest.  
In an assigned reading in a seminar on IR Theories, titled, You Just Don’t 
Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists, Tickner 
(1997) eloquently dissected the instances where International Relations Theory has 
failed to incorporate Feminist Theory’s “critical voices.”15 Although class time was 
not allotted to discussing ‘The Feminist Approach’ in IR in that first semester of my 
graduate studies, I found inspiration to take on the topic at my own admission.  
An innate interest in Feminist International Relations Theory and its 
simultaneous absence from class discussions drew me closer to understanding “these 
continuing silences…that most women are homeless as far as the canons of IR 
knowledge are concerned.”16 I began to veer towards interdisciplinary approaches 
versus the rigidity of a parsimonious one. Part of the advantage to studying 
International Relations in the 21st century is the privilege to borrow from 
groundbreaking alternative frameworks at the edge of ‘mainstream’ social science. 
Since the 1980s, feminist scholars have continually fought the disbelief of others and 
the pedantic discrediting of Feminist Theory in methodology to reinstate an aptitude 
for studying IR that beckons: 
“In contrast to these key mainstream works of the decade, [Cynthia] Enloe asked us 
everywhere to give up thinking that international relations consisted of peopleless 
states, abstract societies, static ordering principles, or even theories about them, and 
begin looking for the many people, places, and activities of everyday international 
politics. Locate those who make the world go round, she said, and cite them.”17 
Most striking of Feminist International Relations Theory is its overlooked 
approach as an interdisciplinary study, despite its grounding in rich, diverse 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Tickner, 1997, p. 619 
16 Tickner, 1997, p. 612; Sylvester, 1994a, p. 316 
17 Sylvester, 2004, p. 3 
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literature.18 Certainly, Feminist International Relations Theory is centered on 
deconstructing a very specific facet in political science: the exclusion or diminishment 
of women via patriarchal politics. However, its perennial feature that “feminists assert 
that the universalism they defend is defined by identifying the experience of a special 
group, (elite men), as paradigmatic of human beings as a whole” divulges a cross-
cultural difference and allows for study of a “symbolic system that shapes many 
aspects of [any] culture.”19  
While feminism has not gained esteem through a succession of waves in the 
‘East’ or developing world, in contrast to ‘Western’ societies where feminism has 
evolved from suffrage to the most contemporary third-wave movement, it would be a 
tragic orientalist notion to assume feminist notions do not exist in Lebanon. In the 
same vein, rejecting feminism as a Western import would be rejecting feminism’s 
long-standing history in Lebanon. However, as this thesis will detail in Chapter 5, 
section 2, feminism has been recognized as existent in Lebanon through individual 
accomplishments of mostly elite women. Whereas, the foundation of this study argues 
an emerging social movement of feminist activism is invested in organizing for 
collective rights of women in Lebanon.  
In the midst of graduate studies, I stumbled upon, quite literally, a few 
feminist activists at the Lebanese American University, Byblos campus. That 
Saturday morning in 2011, I became acquainted with members of Nasawiya, a 
Feminist Collective uniquely based in Beirut, Lebanon. At LAU, Nasawiya members 
were invited to discuss their grassroots initiative to discuss women’s issues with high 
school and undergraduate students part of LAU’s Model U.N. program. Since then, 
Nasawiya has been the focal point of this study’s application of feminist discourse in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Tickner, 1997 
19 Tickner, 1997, pp. 614 & 617 
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nation-state contentious politics. Over the course of a year, I held a position of 
observer-participant at meetings and protests to adhere to a methodology that would 
attempt an exercise in empiricist epistemology found in the feminist theoretical 
approach. 
It is this study’s intent to understand how transnational campaigns ‘empower’ 
women residing in differing temporalities, where Lebanon stands as a case study of 
the existence of post-colonial feminist organizing. Thus, this study aspires to speak up 
with its ‘critical voice’ and illuminate on a greater phenomena boiling in Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, where a proactive movement is cultivating a potentially radical, 
revolutionary feminist polity.  
 
2.3 – Theoretical Approach and Underpinnings 
In revisiting the study of Lebanon’s women’s movement in light of a robust 
feminist movement for new political activism, an interdisciplinary framework is 
employed that includes the use of grounded theories alongside a critical feminist 
research approach. The participant-observer approach and interdisciplinary theoretical 
frameworks provide a symbiotic relationship to inform how this study is a deduction 
of Feminist International Relations Theory and transnational activism from the social 
science fields of transnational feminism, social movements and contentious politics.  
Theory and methodology can offer credible scientific study, however, in social 
scientific inquiry the product of reasoning a social phenomenon is largely reflexive of 
the researcher’s presence.20  Whereas in feminist scholarship, explanatory theories 
and structure of methodology are as much concerned with shaping validity of a study 
as they are, too, concerned with practicing ethical methods cognizant of feminist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Stacey, 1988 
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values towards the treatment of the researched individual or group. Therefore, taking 
account of the researcher’s effects, and particularly in ethnographic research, it is 
imperative to understand the means for acquiring data for the ensuing project.  
Where theory fails to explain feminist phenomena, fieldwork methodology 
may elucidate on the implicit dynamism between research variables in this case study. 
However, this is not met without challenges of its own. Feminist scholars continue to 
grapple with a prototype of a feminist research methodology that honors the 
meticulous marriage of feminism and social science methodology. Certainly, feminist 
research is an aspect of social science study. However, where generally accepted 
social science methodology, and particularly in International Relations, has 
overlooked gender-conscious methodologies, feminist scholars and feminism has 
provided the lacuna for alternative framework.  
While I base my research methodology on a participant-observer approach, 
there is a keen dichotomy between being a participant and an observer in feminist 
research. Specifically, the dichotomy lies in the researcher’s obligation to uphold an 
ethical tradition as both, and separately, as a feminist and a researcher. A role of 
participant-observer provided the most suitable approach since I had already become 
acquainted with the grassroots actions of Nasawiya before submitting my thesis 
proposal. To some lesser degree, my involvement as a participant-observer had to 
exceed more than just as an observer of this esoteric social movement, and 
particularly at a time when the feminist polity was just emerging in Lebanon. 
Although, admittedly, I am in defense of a feministic analysis, revealing political and 
social feminist aspirations in feminist research is akin to seeking validation and merit 
of a critical scholarship.  
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Hereto, this study will refer to data compiled by Lara Khattab (2010) and 
Elinor Bray-Collins (2003) with commentary and analysis of historical context 
supported by Charlotte Weber (2003) on civil society in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. In this comparative study, I will contribute original qualitative 
observations compiled on Nasawiya, Lebanon’s Feminist Collective. My aim is to 
provide a comparative analysis of differing movements within Lebanon’s women’s 
movement by providing another facet of a feminist polity not yet explored. The 
implication being that the “Muted Voices” of the past have emerged with a renewed 
momentum of agency and the critical feminist voices in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement are no longer silenced.21 Bray-Collins and Khattab provide a relevant basis 
of study that explicates the relationship proposed by Suad Joseph’s (1993) 
triangulation of contentious politics and Lebanon’s civil society.  
This study is critical of the existing body of literature on Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. Whereas scholarship has painted Lebanon’s women’s movement as 
complacent, this study rejects this notion and argues for a renewed perspective that 
considers international, systemic effects as conducive to breeding a radical women’s 
movement in Lebanon in lieu of the existent reactionary civil society. 
 Though my observations are original, my deductions are entirely supported 
by grounded theories of social movements (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 
2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005; Von Bülow, 2010) and Feminist 
International Relations Theory. The coupling of interdisciplinary theories has 
inevitably bred analyses that further required the addition of post-colonial theory to 
contextualize the socio-political climate of Lebanon’s feminist polity in relation to 
globalization and internationalism. In particular, post-colonialism provides a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 This is a direct reference to Bray Collins’s 2003 thesis titled “Muted voices: Women’s rights, NGOs, 
and the gendered politics of the elite in post-war Lebanon”. 
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framework for addressing notions in U.S.-Lebanon political relations for 
development.  
The chapter of this study titled An Emancipatory Movement: Organizing 
Nasawiya is devoted solely to analyzing the mechanisms behind sustaining a Feminist 
Collective in a politically, socially, and economically marginalized environment. 
Social movement theories are coupled with a social psychological framework of 
analysis. To understand Nasawiya as a social movement, rather than a formal 
organization with associational ties, it is pertinent to discuss the movement as one that 
supports campaigns and initiatives for individual rights, although it is a movement 
sustained by collective, collaborative efforts.  
 The preceding case study of Nasawiya, a feminist polity and “alternative”22 
social movement in Lebanon’s women’s movement, is a deductive example of 
transnational activism for women’s rights amidst international campaigns, such as the 
U.N. Convention for the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). Specifically, the rise of a feminist polity in Lebanon is examined as an 
example of the rise of contentious politics across boundaries. Borrowing from 
McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001), contentious politics is defined as “episodic, public, 
collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one 
government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”23 
This vantage point of analysis aims to characterize activism in the women’s 
movement in Lebanon as an existential process of contentious politics. This 
assumption becomes particularly relevant to understand the existence of globalized !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 “Alternative” is utilized as a categorical term to distinguish between activists of the feminist 
movement, Nasawiya who outwardly reject any affiliation to reigning political parties in Lebanon and 
work outside of the statist framework with assistance from transnational women’s networks.  
23 McAdam et al., 2001, p. 4 
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contentious politics, that which extend beyond the nation-state. Thus, if contentious 
politics exist beyond nation-state boundaries, in the same vein activism will reactively 
exist as an oppositional force with reach beyond national boundaries. Scholars of 
social movements have proposed that to identify the character of activism is to 
identify the political process of nation-states. Sidney Tarrow (2005) posits social 
movement theory and the concept of political process to assert the significance of a 
social movement in relation to domestic politics.  
This thesis will follow Tarrow’s framework to address the character of 
transnational activism in the women’s movement. Particularly, the usage of Tarrow’s 
framework will provide an analysis of transnational activism as a reactionary political 
process to globalized contentious nation-state politics in Lebanon. Within this 
framework, Tarrow proposes a correlation referred to as “a dense triangular structure 
of relations between states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the 
opportunities which this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different 
levels of this system.”24 For Tarrow, the approach of International Relations Theory 
wherein explicates the relevance of this dynamic relationship coined as 
internationalism, which “operates as a political opportunity structure at the 
international level” and globalization spurs “a source of interest, ideology, and 
grievances” to fuel the causal relationship in contentious politics.25  
Whereas Tarrow provides a grand theory to identify the relevance of 
internationalism, Feminist Theory will replace International Relations Theory in this 
paper to address contentious nation-state politics that spur Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. In replace of modern IR theory, Feminist Theory serves as a spectrum to 
address contentious politics beyond gender-insensitive issues and ultimately to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Tarrow, 2005, p. 25 
25 Tarrow, 2005, pp. 16-19 
 22 
understand an alignment of feminist values in the country’s historically fragmented 
women’s movement. In addition, Suad Joseph (1993) proposes a triangular 
relationship in contentious politics with cultural sensitivity to Lebanon’s case. 
Whereas triangulation of state, civil society, and kinship, or private domain, fosters 
“people’s commitments [to remain] grounded in kin and community, and they carry 
these commitments with them, whether in the civil or state spheres.”26 
Globalization serves as a variable that continues to foster state-centered 
contention speared by neoliberalism and patriarchy, and transnational activism will 
address the need for policies that foster politically and economically progressive 
societies and representative parliamentary political structures. The argument will seek 
to understand the role women’s movements will play in shaping political structures 
through, as Tarrow defines, a political opportunity structure that cultivates 
transnational activism. 
Relationships between the state and NGOs, civil society actors, or activists of 
a social movement continue to be a pertinent factor to determine the success of a 
social movement’s campaign. However, the landscape of contentious politics is 
expanding across borders and regions to facilitate a new transnational activism. The 
eminent scholar of social movements, Sidney Tarrow (2005) posits that transnational 
activism is an organic extension of international nation-state contention propagated by 
globalization and internationalism. Whereas, internationalism has given way for 
collective activism built with a transcendent structure beyond the reach of national 
borders and consisting of activists, interests, resources, and opportunities. In part, the 
internationalist structure has been sustained by global proliferation of NGOs and 
transnational networks.  In the academic study of social movements, scholars have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Jospeh & Stork, 1993, p. 25 
 23 
begun to conceptualize the emergence of transnational activism as a formative 
product of globalization and access to global information. Nonetheless, in the twenty-
first century there appears to be distinctive tools employed by transnational activism 
that encourages such a reach beyond national boundaries, but yet effective only to the 
extent to garner transnational leverage for an impact on domestic economic, social, 
and political issues.  
As scholars of social movements have begun to identify a new character in 
civil society as transnational, literature on the women’s movement has concomitantly 
begun to witness a reflection in feminist discourse. At a 2005 roundtable discussion at 
UCLA on transnational feminism, V. Spike Peterson noted that scholarship is 
deviating from assertions for “identity attribution of who [feminists] are” to exploring 
the nature of transnational activism in the women’s movement, particularly in issues 
of “Third World” countries, women’s agency, and the applicability of Feminist 
Theory to emergence of the women’s movements.  
In identifying patterns of transnational feminist praxis, it is equally imperative 
to discuss theory, and particularly feminist theory in relation to feminist social 
movements within the sphere of transnational activism and international relations. In 
literature of the women’s movement, however, the term transnational feminism seems 
to suffice as a concept that explains both the diffusion of feminist ideology and 
activism within the women’s movement. The inherent value that transnational 
feminism is activism stems from the notion of refuting “the overarching way of 
understanding globalization as a masculinist recuperation of Marxism and 
poststructuralism.” The male dominant view of transnationalism has provided 
admission for feminist scholars to develop theories to fill the lacuna “male 
transnational thinking leaves out,” wherein “the gendered and patriarchal nature of the 
 24 
moribund nation state and nationalist politics and the reliance on the exploitation of 
Third World female labor of the global economy” is addressed along the margins of 
masculine ‘globalizationist’ thinkers.27 
Therefore, in exploring transnational activism in the women’s movement, it is 
imperative to provide the binary distinction between theories and feminist theories, 
just as in transnationalism and feminist transnationalism. Perhaps what this study may 
inadvertently prove is that, although feminist movements are part of the larger 
discourse of women’s movements, a women’s movement does not necessarily equate 
to being a feminist movement. Scholars remark this disconnectedness amongst 
women’s advocacy movements as a fault line between praxis and theory.  
Koretweg and Ray (1999), though offering only a hint of transnational 
activism, conceptualized women’s movements in “Third World”28 countries as 
concerned with democratization, anticolonial and nationalist struggles, religious and 
fundamentalist movements, and socialism. Thus, political discourses in women’s 
movements of these regions are largely derivative of grievances caused by the ruling 
political structures. In transnational activism, the source of contention is farther 
removed is centered between international and state contention. In Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, transnational activism is identified by the tools activist are 
afforded by the Internet, globalization, and an influx funding for women’s rights 
campaigns from social movement organizations (SMOs), intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the U.N., and even through foreign policy interests.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Mendoza, 2002, p. 300 
28 When the term “Third World” is utilized in this thesis to describe a developing region or nation-state, 
quotation marks signify it as a borrowed term from international relations, development studies and 
political economy of world systems (Desai & Naples, 2002, p. 5). Therefore, this thesis does not adhere 
to the usage of “Third World,” but is applied accordingly to its use by respective cited scholars. 
“Postcolonial” will be used in this thesis alongside “Third World” when discussing Postcolonial 
Theory. Ostensibly, both terms are interchangeable, however stem from different academic disciplines.   
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This thesis will attempt to address this shift in feminist discourse on the 
women’s movement with particular attention to the mechanism of transnational 
activism in the women’s movement. Wherein organizing in Nasawiya serves as an 
exemplary representative of grievances and mechanisms feminist activists struggle 
towards bottom-up grassroots political reform.  
 
2.4 – Challenges and Reflections 
Feminist scholars have posited a series of contradictions that may exist in a 
participant-observer approach. An observer-participant role inherently carries an 
undertone for conflict of interests. Whereas the participant facet poses an empathetic 
engagement as an “authentic, related person,” the intersection of the joint role of 
observer is markedly one as being an “exploiting researcher.” From her experience as 
a feminist researcher and ethnographer, Stacey (1988) expresses extreme concern for 
the adverse effects of ethnography. Stacey (1988), Duelli Klein (1983), Mres (1983), 
and Stanely & Wise (1983) have encountered an implication underlying studies 
employing ethnography that this methodology succumbs to “elements of inequality, 
exploitation, and even betrayal” between the researcher and studied individuals. This 
concern is especially contradictory to feminist scholars who take on research projects 
for women, on the topic of women, and yet must avoid further objectifying women in 
research case studies.29 Therefore, a great challenge lies in the researcher’s praxis to 
balance along a tightrope that leads to consistency in the marriage of feminist research 
and social scientific inquiry. Thus, a challenge in this study has been to reconcile this 
very relationship that has opened a window for me to peer inside the sphere of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Stacey, 1988 
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Lebanon’s feminist polity, whilst maintaining detached as not to undermine the 
delicate validity hereto.  
The thesis now turns to a literature review of relevant scholarship on 
transnational activism and transnational feminism to explicate the context from which 
this study is derived. An interdisciplinary approach between the study of social 
movements and contentious politics, Women’s Studies, and International Relation are 
merged to understand the complexity of a feminist movement in Lebanon.  
  
 27 
CHAPTER THREE 
CONTEXTUALIZING TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTIVISM IN THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
Literature on feminism in the Middle East and North Africa region has been 
predominantly preoccupied with defining ‘feminism’ as an identity. In doing so, 
scholarship has concomitantly focused on individual achievements of feminists in the 
region. The following sections provide a departure from polemic debates concerning 
feminism as an identity, and rejects notions of whether feminism is a ‘Western’ 
ideology, whether Islam and feminism are incompatible, and lastly whether feminism 
is inaccessible to societies in developing countries. Rather, this study is grounded in 
the rise of scholarship on transnational feminism to posit that agency within a 
transnational feminist social movement continues to be relevant to explain 
manifestations of systemic patriarchy. 
 
3.2 – The New Transnational Activism of the Twenty-first Century 
In a 2005 publication, Tarrow’s assertions of transnational activism seemed to 
propose a progressive outlook on activism—an approach to resuscitate the study of 
activists as non-institutional, non-state actors with potential to influence the juncture 
of international-domestic politics. Indeed, Tarrow’s theory of new transnational 
activism includes the study of institutional actors, such as NGOs. But the single most 
pertinent assertion to Tarrow’s theory is a reproach to parsimonious scholarly works 
concerned with strictly non-governmental, institutional organization in contentious 
politics. At a time when the influx of NGOs and their transnational networks surfaced 
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in developed and developing countries alike, scholars began to tailor social movement 
theory for the twenty-first century. The dominating approaches either include 
“equivalents at the international level for the stable opportunity structures that had 
been identified in domestic politics, [while] others refashioned their theoretical 
approaches to a more dynamic mechanism-and-process-based approach.”30  
The dominant approaches are either consumed with a ‘global’ approach to 
studying social movements or the latter, divergent approach on comparisons between 
social movements.  Though Tarrow admittedly is a scholar of the latter approach,31 
his latest theory on transnational activism seeks to supplant the former dominant 
approach for a renewed interest on domestic activism as a result of international 
relations. 
“The equation between globalization and contention that we find in much of the 
literature on ‘global social movements’ says both too much and too little: it says too 
little because it leaves out the intervening processes that lead people to engage in 
contentious politics; it says too much because a great deal of the transnational 
activism we find in the world today cannot be traced to globalization. The 
international structure of power is indeed changing in important ways that affect 
contentious politics but not in ways that reduce to the simple equation “globalization 
leads to resistance.”32  
 
Theories of transnational activism emerged in response to the lacuna in 
scholarship to explicate the role of non-institutional entities in domestic social 
movements spurred by international contentious politics. Such literature on 
transnationalism, social movements, and non-state actors has accumulated in theories 
of a “contemporary NGO worldview.” Here, scholars have attempted to explain the 
emergence of a global social movement based on the “bloom” of secular, international 
NGOs with shared values that exist at the international level and are disseminated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Tarrow, 2005, p. 24 
31 See McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001) Dynamics of Contention 
32 Tarrow, 2005, p. 5 
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through transnational networks.33 However, in deducing a structural theory of NGOs, 
scholars came to the conclusion that “the most significant impact of NGOs is indirect, 
influencing the social and material structure of the international system, which in turn 
shapes much more powerful actors.”34 
This assertion conjures up many interpretations in light of the influx of NGOs 
in Lebanon. Are the powerful actors non-institutional entities and autonomous 
activists? In the context of the women’s movement in Lebanon this question beckons 
a reinterpretation at time when women continue to partake in protests and reorganize 
local women’s movements in lieu of institutionalized, political representation. Thus, 
Tarrow’s new transnational activism ruminates on the significance of activism in 
contentious politics, and reinstates the relevance of activism—that which has been 
overshadowed in social movement literature by the influx of nongovernmental 
organizations and institutional entities.  
A priori assumption then of social movements in the twenty-first century is 
their inevitable international character. However, Tarrow (2005) argues that 
transnational movements have been an unfaltering, enduring feature of social 
movement history, and with recognizable “familiar” processes. Europe was a hub for 
transnational movements from the Reformation period to the spread of nationalism 
through colonialism, print, and railroad throughout the 19th century. Transnational 
movements have even sailed across continents such as the anti-slavery movements 
throughout Europe and into American society. These few examples elucidate the 
deftness transnational mobilization has for transforming social issues into political 
causes.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 DeMars, 2005 
34 DeMars, 2005, p. 40 
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Thus, transnational movements are not a new phenomenon. But literature 
suggests that new features in transnational mobilization have emerged, causing 
scholars to reexamine the depth of transnational activism in transnational movements. 
To perceive the significance of contemporary social movements is to understand the 
potential they have of becoming transnational in character. That is not to say social 
movements will become global social movements, but rather a social movement can 
sustain the ability to transfer influence beyond a local fixture. Therefore, 
contemporary social movements beckon examination on two levels: “the equation of 
globalization and contention,” or the survey of contextual social and political 
developments that have given rise to transnational activism, and resultant change in 
the structure of international politics.35 
 Contemporary transnational social movements continue to follow “familiar” 
processes—mobilize up to supranational reach, potential to be diffused across borders 
and become internationally mobilized, or to follow a modularity of protests. These 
persistent processes are now met with globalization, which has operated as an enabler 
to intensify the frequency and magnitude of transnational activism in social 
movements. Tarrow provides a compelling argument for the relevance of 
globalization on transnational activism:  
“But what is most striking about the new transnational activism is both its connection 
to the current wave of globalization and its relation to the changing structure of 
international politics. The former, I argue, provides incentives and causes of 
resistance for many (although not all) transnational activists; but the latter offers 
activists focal points for collective action, provides them with expanded resources 
and opportunities, and brings them together in transnational coalitions and 
campaigns.”36 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Tarrow, 2005, p. 5 
36 Tarrow, 2005, p. 5 
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Tarrow’s attention to the changing structure of international politics explicitly 
refers to the degree non-state actors play in contentious politics. Observations on the 
effects of globalization on social movements have accordingly introduced a purview 
of research that has placed contentious politics on the international level. In 
accordance, various conceptualizations of non-state actors have been introduced as 
units of analysis. As Tarrow succinctly explains: 
“Over the past decade scholars of social movements have expanded their interest 
from local and national to international forms of contention (della Porta, Kriesi, and 
Rucht 1999; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). They 
also broadened their interest from social movements...And while some authors sought 
to find equivalents at the international level for the stable opportunity structures that 
had been identified in domestic politics, others refashioned their theoretical 
approaches to a more dynamic mechanism-and-process-based approach.”37 
There are various labels given to these actors involved in the push and pull of 
contentious politics, dependent on their affiliation vis-à-vis the state or international 
community.  Literature refers to non-state actors of social movements using terms that 
indicate a conglomerate of individuals grouped together. Collective action (Tilly 
1978) civic society, civil society (Amenta & Young 1999; Tarrow 2005) civil society 
organizations (CSOs) (Von Bülow 2010), network society (Castells 1996), activists, 
society activists, institutional or non-institutional actors (Tarrow 2005), NGOs, 
international organizations (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; DeMars 2004), 
activist networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998), issue networks (Lind, 2005), civic 
participation (Sheridan-Rabideau, 2008, 161), nonprofits (Martin, 2 November 2011) 
are prominent markers used in analyzing groups of actors in contentious politics.  
However, activist persists as the most distinct concept scholars utilize to 
distinguish which actors of social movements push for a revolutionary, or radical 
agenda. Discourse on activism expounds that such actors of social movements will, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and above all other categories of non-state actors, seize the “factors that give rise to 
social movements,” or as Doug McAdams (1982) defined as “expanding 
opportunities” in political structures.38 This detail is pertinent for differentiating the 
unit of analysis when discussing transnational activism. Although the delineated 
concepts are used interchangeably in colloquial terms, the nuances of action-output 
among non-state actors are greatly constrained by associations and group affiliations.   
 
3.3 – Transnational Feminist Organizing  
 If transnational activism can transmit a reach beyond state borders and is 
formed as a product of shared contentious politics between one state and another, or 
between a multitude of states, then out of such activism there can emerge a collective 
social movement with its own supposed revolutionary agenda. Though the women’s 
movement is a robust social movement, and certainly not a new phenomenon, its 
reach has implicated movements from other regions and nations in attempts to form 
an international, collective social movement for a revolutionary agenda.  
However, despite its long-standing existence, and since its inception, the 
women’s movement has faced internal differences of identity attribution that has 
sustained its fragmentation and kept feminist and activists alike from consolidating 
into a transnational movement.  
Before addressing transnational activism in the women’s movement as an 
emerging character of 21st century contentious politics, it is pertinent to discuss the 
historical attempts for a globalized women’s movement. These methods have taken 
place under concepts of international feminism, global sisterhood, global feminism, 
and most contemporarily, transnational feminism. Just as the theoretical conception of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Meyer, 1999, p. 184 
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feminism and Feminist Theory has undergone transformative waves, the women’s 
movement accordingly has to. Thus, there exists a comprehensive body of literature 
that explains the evolution of the women’s movement from the standpoint of 
attribution identity, which ends with contemporary scholarship on transnational 
feminism. In light of feminist scholarship, and as Peterson noted in 2005, scholars 
have neglected the study of collective activism from the approach of social movement 
theory. This point will be revisited in the next section to examine transnational 
activism in transnational feminism and the women’s movement.    
In the meantime, feminist scholars have markedly observed attempts at 
unifying women’s movements across the world through initiatives by first-wave 
feminist organizations, like Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
the International Alliance of Women, and the Young Christian Association.39 These 
organizational structures propagated the earliest known theoretical framework for an 
international women’s movement. This framework, conceptualized as international 
feminism, sought to reconcile First World and Third World women’s movement with 
“a belief in the universal applicability of Western standards of progress.”40 Historian 
Charlotte E. Weber attributes first-wave feminism’s failure to breach ties with 
international women’s movements due to the overt imperialist nature from the 
Western feminists’ attitudes. 
Transnational feminism differs from international feminism, which has existed 
since the inception of first wave feminism and the beginning of the women’s 
movement. Whereas, according to scholar of Women’s Studies, Nayereh Tohidi 
argues that transnational feminism “is more recent and is more directly connected to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Nayereh Tohidi, among other feminist scholars, cited these organizations as spearing international 
feminism as “organizational manifestations of first wave feminism and its [the women’s movement] 
regional or international expansion during the early 20th century” while at a UCLA sponsored 
roundtable titled Transnational Feminism: A Range of Disciplinary perspectives (2005, May 18). 
40 Weber, 2003, ii 
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the processes of globalization” unlike international feminism which garnered regional 
and international expansion in the early 20th century.  
“Implicated in the novel notion of transnational feminism is the desirability 
and possibility of a political solidarity of feminists across the globe that transcends 
class, race, sexuality and national boundaries.”41 
Previously, a great deal of feminist scholarship addressed the emergence of 
transnational feminism in the women’s movement in other regions, neglecting the 
Middle East North African region until the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan 
brought forth an imperative focus. Though the theory of transnational activism is 
attributed to the school of social movement theory, feminist scholar Nadje Sadig Al-
Ali enumerates the effects of hegemonic foreign policies on women’s living 
conditions, with particular attention to the Iraqi women living with effects of the U.S.-
led Iraq Wars—the Gulf War and the War on Terrorism. Al-Ali implicitly utilizes a 
transnational causality to explain the effects of international contentious politics on 
the domestic living conditions of women and the long-standing Iraqi women’s 
movement.42 
Scholars such as Nadje Sadig Al-Ali, Suad Joseph, and Valentine Moghadam 
provide an extensive contribution to the topic of the women’s movement, feminism, 
and politics of the women’s movements throughout the MENA region. Their 
theoretical frameworks enlighten Feminist Theory and International Relations on a 
scale of issues between the relationship of women and the state. As globalization and 
internationalism have taken a widespread affect, Al-Ali, Joseph, and Moghadam 
continue to provide relevant frameworks to assess the informal and formal ways 
women have in the past organized in ‘Arab’ society.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Mendoza, 2002, p. 296 
42 See Al-Ali (2007) Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present and (2009) What Kind of 
Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq 
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The most enduring assertion from Al-Ali, Joseph, and Moghadam is the 
existence of patriarchal states across the MENA region and the abasement and 
constraints perpetuated by the state against women. In Lebanon, the women’s 
movement has largely been divided on the basis of two factors: nation-state 
contention from a reluctance to legislate liberal personal status laws equally among 
women across religious sects; and the cooptation by sectarian cartels of draft laws for 
women’s rights.  
However, this study is not intended to provide a didactic argument in regards 
to feminist identities in Lebanon. Nor does it purport that a single feminist identity 
pervades the women’s movement. As a case study alone, the demographic of activists 
in Lebanon’s grassroots movement, Nasawiya’s existence can attest to the plurality of 
feminist and political ideologies. 
Nor is this study concerned with elucidating a thesis on the international 
women’s movement. Feminist scholars and historians have written extensively on the 
formation, emergence, and failure of the first international women’s movement and its 
heyday “In 1853, when the international women’s movement was most active.”43 
However, this period is notable for its attempts to connect women throughout the 
world through the dissemination of literature on feminism and annual conventions. 
Though purely a vestige of the first international women’s movement, a pamphlet 
titled On the Necessity of Extending a Decent Welcome to Foreign Women proposed 
the formation of a feminist civil society with headquarters in major cities “where 
women could safely congregate.”44 This sentiment expressed on behalf of French 
feminist Flora Tristan has become a universally shared aspiration among women’s 
movements. The international women’s movement did not progress beyond the first-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Anderson, 2000, p. 194 
44 Anderson, 2000, p. 141 
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wave feminist movement. However, in replace, a civil society within the 
contemporary women’s movement transpired, and continues to persist in the form of 
women’s NGOs and transnational networks.   
An ancillary effect on Western feminists after a thwarted attempt at the first 
international women’s movement realized a “nationally oriented” approach with 
“[activists] far more cautious than their predecessors” in the movement’s late 1860s 
revision.45 A recount of the first failed international women’s movement postulates 
two points that continue to resonate in the twenty-first century: nationalism is a 
perennial feature of the women’s movement and contemporary women’s movement 
activism, and organization must be refined to reroute women’s movements around 
this factor, rather than exclude it, in order to accommodate a sustainable international 
women’s movement.   
While the latter seems light years ahead, women organizing and protesting in 
Lebanon for reformed personal status laws, and particularly against gender-based 
violence, subsequently provides insight into the purview of transnational activism. 
The landscape of activism and protests are remnants of transnational influence and for 
leverage in ways that are enabling activists in profound social movements for 
progressive polities.   
A literature review of transnational activism and feminist scholarship on 
women’s movements will provide the bulk of the preliminary analysis. The 
historically fragmented women’s movement in Lebanon will be a focus, or testing 
ground for conceptualizing transnational activism. The most effective contribution 
this thesis can do is attempt to forecast a slight outcome that considers the new 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Anderson, 2000, p. 205 
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landscape of activism emerging from the existent civil society of NGOs and 
transnational networks. 
As ousted, even persecuted authoritarians have been procured to relinquish 
governance by vigorous campaigns for “democracy from below,” a looming question 
beckons whether women, who have been prominent figures in mobilizing MENA 
protests, will be direct beneficiaries of the new political structures implemented in 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, and potentially other impending nation-states.46 
If their outcomes are revolutionary, “the creation of new arenas more open to the 
control of public opinion” will be instituted with an ethos towards “a new conception 
of democracy wherein citizens influence decision makers as more than electors.”47  
The case of Lebanon highlights this potential, yet inevitable shift of feminist 
activists into political actors.48 The unanswerable, yet impending question is not ‘what 
if’, but when the will women’s movements in MENA countries produce respective 
political parties to directly address social and cultural factors hindering equity 
amongst men and women.  
The mechanism of an emerging feminist political party in Lebanon seems too 
transparent – women are involved in spheres of politics except in decision-making 
position, from where women have been largely excluded by the politics of a boys 
club.49 However, Lebanese women are aware of their next step to permeate a 
patriarchal state: through collective action for a feminist political party. The political 
and social culture of protest seems to be the definitive process to steers democratic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 della Porta, 1999, p. 66; Roth 1994; see also Dalton 1994 
47 della Porta, 1999, p. 66; Willelms, Wolf, and Eckert, 1993; Offe, 1985; Kitschelt,1993 
48 Khraiche, D. (2012, February 24). Women’s spring: Is Lebanon ready for a feminist  
political party. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-
News/2012/Feb-24/164431-wome...-is-lebanon-ready-for-a-feminist-political-
party.ashx#axzz1xaiVXicw 
49 In response to a growing movement for a feminist political party, Interior Minister Marwan Charbel 
responded with: “Let us see whether [Lebanese] women would succeed more than [Lebanese] men, 
particularly as we have experienced men in this field [politics].” 
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participation. At the least, social movements matter for a “movements’ production of 
meaning.”50  
Among Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
UAE, opinion polls have shown that the procession of protests since 2010 have 
carried a distinct political discourse for “expanding employment”—a concern that has 
been cultivating since 2001.51 In conjunction, a second tier of social issues has entered 
the political landscape in 2011. Opinion poll respondents from Jordan, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE have pronounced concerns on social issues such as political 
reform, advancing democracy, and protecting personal and civil rights. Tunisia and 
UAE interestingly were the only nations to express a “prominent concern” for 
women’s rights.52 The disconnect in Lebanon’s respondents’ concern between 
‘protecting personal and civil rights’ and women’s rights is a notable feature in 
Lebanon’s political rights for citizens. Namely, the confusion persists between human 
rights and women’s rights—that is, gender issues are largely alienated from political 
discourse.   
The preceding points on transnational activism, however, reflect an impending 
emergence of a new feature of Lebanon’s women’s movement. Particularly due to the 
emergence of an inclusive, feminist based movement, Nasawiya. As seen in the shift 
of academic feminist discourse, perhaps the time of identity attribution has 
culminated into a period where women’s movements will seek solidarity with a 
greater emphasis on agency. Most poignantly, perhaps the diffusion of feminist liberal 
values will breed a uniquely feminist liberal movement in Lebanon. Regardless, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 della Porta, 1999, p. 67 
51 Zogby, J. (2011, December 20). The ‘Arab Spring’ effect on political discourse. Al- 
Jazeerah: Cross-Cultural Understanding. Retrieved from 
http://www.ccun.org/Opinion%20Editorials/2011/December/20%20o/The...fect%20on%20Arab%20Po
litical%20Discourse%20By%20James%20Zogby.htm 
52 Zogby, 2011 
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activists are recognizing the nuance relationship between human rights and women’s 
rights, and the social constructs embedded in nation-state contention in the country’s 
contemporary women’s movement.  
 
3.4 – Globalization, Internationalism and Transnational Feminist 
Activism 
Although states remain as the fundamental framework of contention, while 
grievances continue to resonate across state borders and unify organizations under an 
umbrella of a social movement.  The framework for transnational contention arises in 
effect. In Egypt, the documented gender-based violence against women generated a 
new level of grievances.53 Women were not only a part of the uprisings against 
Egypt’s political system, but an offshoot of the larger social movement has emerged 
to address sexual violence and patriarchal values latent in Egypt’s politically 
transitioning environment. As broadcasted footage of military aggression against 
peaceful protesters surfaced on the Internet, a rhetorical and social link amongst 
activists for women’s rights from Egypt to Lebanon formed in the rhetoric and 
symbols used in December 2011 and January 2012 demonstrations.  
The instrument of mass media communication is instrumental in providing 
linkages between social movements across societies. Namely, as the heightened 
response of protestors for women’s rights in Egypt were broadcasted on any media 
outlet in existence, activists in Lebanon resonated their campaigns against sexual 
violence to create a solidarity movement. Through this, a social meme of utilizing ‘the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Amnesty International. (23, December 2011). Egypt’s women must be able to protest in peace. 
Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypts-women-must-be-allowed-protest-peace-2011-
12-23 
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blue bra’ has emerged to signify female empowerment.54 On the streets of Sanayeh 
district, ‘the blue bra’ emerged once again, however this time in the context of 
intentionally expressing transnational solidarity for female empowerment through 
protest.  
 A clear movement for women’s rights has sprung in the midst of uprisings in 
the Middle East and North Africa in response to state contention. It is imperative to 
recognize the structural forces that have debilitated women from social mobility in the 
past, and namely from entering the political sphere. Discourse of feminism and 
critiques of the neoliberal economic structures argue that economic reform coupled 
with patriarchal political structures have been a formidable threat against women 
developing countries.  
Though the diffusion and efflorescence of the women’s movement in Lebanon 
has been the product of local actors, civil society has been effectively mobilized with 
foreign assistance and international organizations. Thus, the dynamic relationship 
between local and international actors is worth considering in how transnational 
activism has created a momentum conducive to instigating policy change.  
Before addressing the status of the women’s movement in context to the rabid 
mobilization across Lebanon’s women’s movement, it is pertinent to consider the 
history of the movement’s largely fragmented past. This overview provides a 
synthesis of literature on the political opportunity structure of women’s rights in 
nation-states. This approach will attempt to illuminate on the evolution of the 
women’s movement first by defining “the preconditions of mobilization, [which is 
enacted upon by] women’s abilities to form collective identities [and] articulate their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Footage of ‘The Girl in the Blue Bra’ surfaced onto YouTube to reveal evidence of systematic 
violence against men and women during a December 17 protest in Tahrir Square, Cairo (Amaria, 
2011).  
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interests [that] are shaped by political, local, and historically contingent processes.55 
This analysis will ultimately coincide with Tarrow’s assumption that states remain as 
key players in contentious politics in transnational activism.  
 
3.5 – Conclusion 
While academics of social movements have been largely concerned with the 
study of campaigns for political Islam in the Middle East, campaigns for women’s 
rights movements are growing robust in this region, and can afford to supply 
academics of social movement with a criteria worthy of observation. Whereas, the 
study of women’s movements has provided inferences to economic and political 
reform in Middle East countries, in the wake of uprisings and transitional political 
systems, the mobilization of women’s movements will provide an insight to the 
functionality of new state structures implemented after decades of authoritarianism. 
An especially interesting observation for scholars of social movements will be a 
comparison of emergent policies for women’s rights from before to after regime 
change, along with the prevalence of women voted into legislative office. These 
factors will provide scholars of women’s movements the implication of political 
opportunity on women’s rights during political transitions. 
This paper attempts to identify transnational activism as the contemporary 
landscape in Lebanon’s women’s movements as an example of the effects of ratifying 
U.N. transnational policies for women’s rights. In Lebanon, transnational activism in 
the women’s movement has given rise to a feminist social movement. In particular, 
this movement is challenging the existing structure of Lebanon’s civil society 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Korteweg & Ray, 1999, p. 53 
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pertaining to women’s advocacy campaigns that which continue to be coopted by 
Lebanon’s patriarchal political system.  
Through identifying transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s movement, 
this study characterizes the aspects of Lebanon’s patriarchal system that stem from 
internationalism and globalization. International partnerships, the influx of NGOs and 
transnational networks, and foreign aid have contributed to opening up an otherwise 
closed political system in Lebanon. However, these partnerships have mostly carried a 
bias for the interest of donors. U.S.-Lebanese relations under the guise of human 
rights policies have done more for sustaining status quo reactionary politics than 
addressing Lebanon’s burgeoning feminist polity and its push for progressive 
women’s rights. In doing so, U.S. foreign policy is only instrumental in exacerbating 
Lebanon’s patriarchal political system and inadvertently hindering social, economical, 
and political development in Lebanon. 
In the face of setbacks, Lebanon’s feminist polity, however, has muddled 
through domestic and systemic forces. Since Bray-Collin’s 2003 observation of 
Lebanese feminists existing “despite their small numbers,” the community certainly 
has not disintegrated nor become fragmented, but rather is faring with increasing 
membership and inclusive campaign initiatives.56 Lebanon’s feminist social 
movement provides a case study of transnational activists, affected by transnational 
grievances, yet organizing towards a purely domestic cause.  
Before policy makers can address an international women’s movement as a 
solution to alleviate global patriarchy, scholars of social movements, and particularly 
of transnational feminism, must address the means in which citizenry are more 
focused on combating domestic issues with local campaigns.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Bray-Collins, 2003, p. 128 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN LEBANON’S 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
This chapter will address the roots of transnational activism in Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, highlighting its existence as a recent phenomenon among the 
country’s women’s movement. In this contemporary wave of activism, the women’s 
movement aims to repurpose its campaigns towards grassroots methods for political 
reform and away from a community of domestic and international elitist organizations 
headed under corporatist and sectarian structures. In doing so, Lebanon’s women’s 
advocacy groups base their frame of reference for financial support and political 
leverage on international agencies to support their campaigns on women’s human 
rights, a feature of post-war development. However, in a recent phenomenon, a 
minority of transnational feminist activists of Lebanon’s women’s movement is 
already spearing the next wave of new transnational activism.   
As discussed in Chapter Three, transnational activism is a social movement 
dynamic that emerges from an international political opportunity structure in the 
domestic sphere, yet is prompted by systemic, international effects. This chapter will 
investigate the forms of transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s movement and 
attempt to demonstrate the emergence of a feminist polity as a result of transnational 
impacts.  
The beginning sections of this chapter will explain the dynamic model of 
internalizing and externalizing contention for women’s human rights in Lebanon’s 
women’s movement (Tarrow, 2005). This process will be argued as the mechanism 
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that has fostered the momentum of transnationalism and the popularity of “market 
structures” or “hierarchical governance structures” in women’s advocacy groups and 
NGOs.57 The latter section will consider of the emergence of horizontal organizing 
spurred by the diffusion of feminist liberal discourse into Lebanon’s contemporary 
grassroots women’s movement and supported by the rise of a transnational feminism 
and network society.58  
The process of internalizing contention is cited as the introduction of 
internationalist discourse into Lebanon’s women’s movement. Internalized contention 
is a concept borrowed from social movement theory (Tarrow, 2005) to describe the 
advent phase of a top-down approach in a transnational movement. The section in this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Von Bülow, 2010, p. 29 
58 In chapters 4-6 of this study, a implicit distinction will be emerge between Lebanon’s espoused 
“liberal” political system versus the emergence of a reactive movement to promulgate an ideology of 
liberal feminism and a pro-secular agenda in a grassroots campaign. The notion of an existent liberal 
political system in Lebanon is supported by Lebanon’s amended 1990 constitution and U.N. state 
reports. Specifically, U.N. oversight of transnational policy implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women in Lebanon describes, “The system is 
liberal, based on respect of freedoms, including freedom to form political parties, freedom of speech, 
and freedom of belief. The election system in Lebanon does not adopt proportional representation; it is 
a denominational system which distributes representation among the denominations and sects in the 
various regions.” Wherein, Lebanon’s liberal political system recognizes women’s rights as human 
rights, thus policies for women’s rights “are not open to interpretation or division. Accordingly, 
women’s rights should be viewed in accordance with the laws, conventions, and constitutions related to 
human rights…this legislation [of CEDAW] must eliminate sexual discrimination and the injustice 
visited upon women in order to equally safeguard women’s rights as well as human rights” (CEDAW, 
2004 September 2). I argue that Lebanon is not a liberal state and thus does not sustain an 
infrastructure to promulgate human rights, let alone women’s rights. This study implicitly argues the 
caveat of “Women’s Rights is Human Rights” stems from a largely colonial interest. This is in contrast 
to the transnational feminist movement of liberal feminism in Lebanon that calls for gender-related 
decrees that will address gender-based violence as an offense that take place not only during wartime, 
but also in the private sector. In this chapter, the study will follow the impact of this triangular 
relationship between the women’s movement demands for liberal feminist policies, the Lebanese 
patriarchal state that which functions under neoliberalism, and U.N. agencies that which ultimately 
perpetuate the interests of elite decision makers and states. According to Human Rights Watch,   
“Reform in Lebanon stagnated in 2011, in part because Lebanon proved mostly immune to the Arab 
Spring and its widespread popular calls for change. The stagnation was also caused by internal 
divisions, which prevented progress on draft laws to stop    torture, improve the treatment of migrant 
domestic workers, and protect women from domestic violence. Women face discrimination under 
personal status laws, and vulnerable groups are reportedly mistreated or tortured in detention. Lebanese 
authorities and humanitarian organizations have provided material assistance to the influx of Syrians 
fleeing their country’s fighting, but needs are increasing. An estimated 300,000 Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon live in appalling social and economic conditions” (Human Rights in Lebanon, Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/lebanon).    
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chapter titled Internalizing Contention for Growth of Women’s Advocacy NGOs will 
explore the gradual development of women’s advocacy groups from national to 
transnational organizations.  
Top-down internalized contention from a supranational, neoliberal institution 
is the most explicit variable of international political contention and initiation for 
diffusion of neoliberal political discourse into Lebanon’s social movements. To put it 
boldly, the model of internalizing contention is characteristic of a top-down global 
approach where existing interests from an international agency or international 
community are presented as a frame to support and sustain domestic development. 
However, as transnational relations deepen, systemic effects may become apparent, as 
non-state actors are unable to supersede the state. The political interests of an 
international body are best left for an analysis apart from this study, and require an 
entire discussion in itself. For the purpose of this study, international interests are 
understood in general terms, as a sphere of influence and an impetus for expanding 
neoliberalism and potential security interests. These interests are inherently 
patriarchal and hindering for women empowerment and gender equality (can you cite 
some other scholars who say this?).  
In Lebanon, the growth of civil society groups has largely resulted from 
supranational interests to build a robust civil society. For Lebanon’s women’s 
movement, this approach has taken form by instituting pressure groups and lobbyists 
for state accountability to legislate women’s rights within the framework of universal 
women’s rights as human rights. 
This approach has facilitated participation and inclusion of Lebanon and its 
women’s advocacy groups in transnational conferences and campaigns within this 
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new international political opportunity structure.59 This type of inclusion has become 
characteristic of Lebanese behavior in the post-civil war era. In return, women’s 
advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations have begun to adopt 
transnational activist approaches in externalizing contention to seek assistance beyond 
the state. In this vein, the focus of the argument is to extend an analysis beyond state 
effects to demonstrate the significance of international support that has created an 
international political opportunity structure for civil society to participate in activism 
towards political and social issues concerning women. Although the grievances for a 
lack of state accountability and need of recognition for women’s rights is a 
longstanding fixture of the women’s movement, the emergent neoliberal 
organizational structure underpinning the character of Lebanon’s contemporary 
women’s movement has become the latest source of fragmentation within the 
movement.  
The proceeding section on Transnational Impacts on Lebanon’s Women’s 
Movement discusses the transition from internalizing to externalizing contention on 
behalf of movement organizers and partnerships. Within this process of transnational 
contention, women’s advocacy groups are described to have formed partnerships with 
international and transnational agencies under a consolidated national institution. In 
externalizing contention, women’s advocacy groups align their causes and campaigns 
with international funders and their agendas. The dynamic relationship that ensues 
between international and domestic civil society attempts to supersede state 
contention. In the context of Lebanon’s civil society, however, patriarchal elites and 
decision-makers ultimately co-opt prospective leverage between Lebanon’s national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Development assistance from the U.N. has been ongoing since post 1975-1990 war. However, the 
July 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah initiated funding for the new program area “Gender 
Equality and Women’s Empowerment” as what began under SCR 1325 and in partnership between 
UNFPA and NCLW for 2006-2010. 
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women’s institution and the international sphere, thus reasserting sovereignty of the 
state. It is imperative to note that within this process of externalizing contention, 
transnational activism exists but is largely ineffectual.   
The processes of internalizing and externalizing contention for a transnational 
women’s movement from a top-down approach has not improved the dismal progress 
in implementing legislation of women’s rights. Rather, transnational, professional 
networks in Lebanon’s civil society continue to multiply without coherent results. In 
response, a sequence of proactive grassroots movements has emerged as a result of 
the international political contention between the state and Lebanon’s women’s 
institution.  
The latter half of this chapter will continue to analyze the evolving structure of 
the women’s movement in Lebanon to discuss the spur of a transnational feminist 
movement. In Against Hegemonic Interests: The Call to Reaffirm Grassroots 
Campaigns, a discussion of transnational features will reveal an emergence of a 
grassroots feminist collective with transnational grievances bred by international 
political contention and alienation by the state and Lebanon’s women’s institutions. 
This section will provide a preliminary assessment of a new transnational grassroots 
movement. In what initially began as a top-down global movement, transnationalism 
in Lebanon’s women’s movement seems to have buttressed the emergence of a 
grassroots transnational feminist movement.  
 
4.2 – Internalizing Contention for Growth of Women’s Advocacy 
NGOs 
Activism in Lebanon’s women’s movement has become more transnational 
despite stagnant political, social, and economical constraints against women. Yet, and 
 48 
despite these roadblocks, Lebanon’s women’s movement has become a transnational 
fixture in international campaigns. An emergence of its transnational facet began 
developing with participation of women at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing. From this opening, women’s advocacy groups have grown in 
numbers as a result of a transnational agenda to pressure state implementation of 
transnational policies that secure domestic women’s rights as human rights.60  
It is indisputable that Lebanon’s women’s movement has languished at the 
hands of an unresponsive government. In the eyes of elite decision makers, however, 
the women’s movement has generated significant milestones. In a public broadcast, 
former parliamentarian, Nayla Mouawad inadvertently depicted an interesting 
significance of women’s involvement in transnational conferences in the nineties of 
post-war Lebanon: 
Interviewer: In the eighteen years that you were a member of parliament from 1991 to 
2009 things must have evolved for women. 
Mouawad: Of course.  
I: Can you think of one specific change that happened while you were there? 
M: In 1992, there was the first [Earth] Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Of course, [the 
heading of the conference] was Keeping the Environment, but one of the main titles 
[concerned the topic] without women you cannot do anything, nor can we have 
sustainable projects—economic, environmental or anything else. Then, there were 
other world summits. There was the Copenhagen summit and the Beijing summit that 
were especially for women. 
I: And Lebanon was involved in those. 
M: Very much so—and women of Lebanon.61 
 
When asked of specific accomplishments for women during her reign as 
Member of Parliament and Minister of Social Affairs,62 Mouawad noticeably could 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 According to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Annex I, article 14 states they are 
“convinced” the framework for women’s rights must be perceived as human rights. The Beijing 
Declaration can be accessed from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf 
61 Naufal, Y. (2012 March 12). Youmna Naufal interviews Nayla Mouawad. Future News Television, 
Beirut: Future Television. Retrieved from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcJmObhTQLk&feature=relmfu 
62 Between 1991-2009, Nayla Mouawad was the second Lebanese woman to serve as a Member of 
Parliament, along with a Ministerial position of Social Affairs. Myrna Bustany holds the honor of first 
woman to be elected into Parliament during 1964-1965. In that time, between 1965-1991, women held 
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not provide a single example of legislation for women’s rights, although she is 
“proud” of the ones she did amend. Instead, Mouawad’s energetic response alluded to 
the greater permeation of internationalism into Lebanon’s political and social affairs 
as the sole advancement for women. The advances women were given, if anything, 
were miniscule and noticeable on a transnational level, where Lebanon’s women’s 
admission into the Fourth World Conference on Women allowed then for a 
“migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics…where a 
strong supranational authority [provided] a visible target for local citizens.”63 The 
visible target being the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, wherein the 
overall campaign for “women’s rights are human rights” began.64 
Before analyzing the internalized/externalized process of contention that led to 
transnational activism in Lebanon’s contemporary women’s movement, it is 
imperative to recall the recent history of transnationalism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. From this reflection, an understanding of the current political opportunity 
structure will provide an explanation of the basis of transnational activism as an 
attempt for a proactive women’s movement.  
The distinguishing feature between the recent past and the contemporary 
temporality of the women’s movement lies in the structure of organizing and 
mobilizing members of women’s advocacy groups. In Lebanon, inherent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the position of first lady while women’s groups focused their causes on relief work for the duration of 
the 1975-1990 war in Lebanon (Khattab, 2010). 
63 Tarrow, 2005, p. 79 
64 This conviction has led the women’s movement to fragment over the application of women’s rights 
are humans rights versus women’s human rights. Human rights are statist laws meant to protect citizens 
from the state, whereas women’s human rights are social laws that recognize gendered violence against 
women. However, this argument is not the focal point of this study and requires empirical tests, where 
“A true test of human rights strategies requires a detailed empirical study that situates the language of 
human rights in its social and historical context, assesses the impact of human rights instruments, and 
analyzes the influence of both on social movement activism” (Clément, 2008). Rather, in identifying 
the character of transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s movement, an emphasis is placed on this 
adopted conviction that women’s rights are human rights as exemplary of global framing Lebanon’s 
women’s movement in alignment with U.N. conventions in transnational campaigns. In this chapter, I 
will argue the pitfalls of reframing women’s rights are human rights as to leverage patriarchal elites to 
distort draft laws on gender-based violence to meet the requirement of universal human rights laws. 
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characteristics of structure, relations between other groups and organizations, power 
dynamics with ruling elite, and funding are enduring determinants of an advocacy 
group or organization’s operability as an impetus for social change.65 An additional 
feature, typical of a contemporary advocacy group of transnational activism, is its 
usage of social media. The more contemporary and transnational it is in scope, the 
more essential social media becomes as a means for sustaining organization and 
mobilization. However, before the women’s movement incorporated means such as 
social media, public access and grassroots organization for social change, scholars 
note Lebanon’s women’s movement widely consisted of professional women’s 
organizations that “do not fit the…developmental paradigm [and] rather [sic] are 
corporatist and elitist structures that fail to address and meet ordinary women’s 
needs”.66 
For Beijing and beyond, the Lebanese state appointed a group of women to the 
National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW), an “official,” national 
organization.67 Since 1995, the committee, or as the NCLW refers to itself as a 
“machinery,” has been primarily responsible for overseeing drafts of national 
strategies for achieving women’s advancement and gender equality under the 
conventions of transnational policies, and particularly in accordance to CEDAW.  In 
parallel, the NCLW distributes assignment to women’s NGOs in civil society to bring 
social and political awareness to internalized contentions. Through a trickle-down 
policy of top-down funding and agenda setting, the NCLW is simultaneously 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Khattab, 2010, p. 78 
66 Khattab, 2010, p. 91 
67 According to the NCLW website, the organization is the only recognized body by the state of 
Lebanon as the “mechanism responsible for managing women’s advancement and gender equality in; it 
reports directly to office of the Prime ministry” (Who is NCLW? Retrieved from 
http://www.nclw.org.lb/Faq).  
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responsible for allotting U.N. funding and for institutionalizing partnerships between 
civil society groups and transnational agencies.  
The harm in allocating the vast majority of transnational leverage to the 
NCLW reflects in its bias to support women’s groups that will similarly adopt the 
same characteristics, mechanisms, and processes. Since its official establishment in 
1998,68 the NCLW has been in charge of campaigns for women’s rights, however its 
formal structure does not grant decision-making power, and thus functions alongside 
the sectarian, patriarchal state. The NCLW’s role has granted women opportunities to 
participate in transnational partnerships to build an institution for women. However, 
without the formal allocation of decision-making power, the NCLW is an idle 
organization that has led the women’s movement to stagnate while “corporatist, elitist 
and sectarian-based structures permeate and dominate the women’s associational 
landscape.”69 Further, and most evocative of a patriarchal system, the NCLW has 
been largely a dumping ground for qualified, educated women who can rival their 
male counterparts yet are denied the opportunities to do so. Implicit in the 
organizational structure of the NCLW is an overwhelming segregation of women 
from entering actual realms of leadership and political decision-making, relegating 
them instead to working in the sphere of civil society.  
 As for its bias for working cooperatively with the patriarchal system, the 
NCLW shares this mechanism with its domestic partners in internalizing U.N. 
contention, by forming cooperative, complacent, and almost conformist attitudes to 
the hierarchal market structure of neoliberalism and globalization that ultimately !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 The NCLW is a transplant of the National Committee for the Follow up of Women’s Issues 
(NCFUWI). The NCFUWI consisted of men and women whom prepared for the Fourth World 
Conference in 1995. Subsequent to the creation of the NCLW, NCFUWI became a women’s advocacy 
NGO under the acronym of CFUWI .The NCLW overtook administrative and organizational duties in 
1998 under law 720, which “entrusts missions” of consultation, liaison and coordination, and execution 
concerning Lebanese women’s affairs. (Who is NCLW? Retrieved from http://www.nclw.org.lb/Faq) 
69 Khattab, 2010, p. 91 
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prioritizes funding and partnerships with prestigious affiliations over grassroots 
organizing. In return, the funders as “international aid agencies strengthen [the] 
corporatist rather than grassroots associations, contribute to marginalize women’s 
interests and needs and impede comprehensive reforms.”70 
The privilege to enter the international sphere as a representative body for 
Lebanese women at international and regional conferences and workshops was 
largely benefitting an esoteric group of women in Lebanon, and would only increase 
inclusivity of other women’s groups and NGOs in a matter of fifteen years. By 2011, 
the inclusivity of NGOs was nationally appointed to activism on women’s rights by 
the original women’s movement from Beijing. As the movement containing the 
earlier generation of “feminist” from Beijing took on a market, hierarchal structure, a 
trickle-down of this structure has ultimately permeated through the organizational 
structure of any women’s advocacy group that which aligns with the state-controlled, 
statist-centric alignment of the NCLW.  
The complacency upheld among activists in hierarchal, market structure 
organizations is staggering and equally ineffective for mobilizing reformist agendas. 
In a hierarchal market structure, neoliberal practices are not questioned, but rather, 
adopted. For the women’s movement, this is hypocritical on behalf of the NCLW that 
boasts support for feminist ideals. Rather, the NCLW is a product of segregated 
political participation between men and women, and its implicit cooperation with the 
state only enables the patriarchal character of decision makers. The segregation of 
women from decision-making positions is noticed in the gendered structure of the 
NCLW, where its position in politics is largely to displace international pressure on 
women’s rights from the hands of the elite. In this unfortunate dynamic, the NCLW 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Khattab, 2010, p. 91 
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and its community of women’s advocacy groups inevitably become the scapegoat for 
the state’s lack of responsiveness, while the cycle of fragmentation between women’s 
advocacy groups continues.  
The women’s movement in Lebanon has existed for as long as Lebanon’s 
women have been the sites of contention for male domination. Thus, the enduring 
feature of Lebanon’s women’s movement is the women who continually protest for 
demands that are inherent for their inherent individual and collective wellbeing. 
Insofar, I have argued the emergence of transnationality in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement and its existence as an enduring feature of civic society in the twenty-first 
century. In this landscape for activism, women continue to be the vehicle for force, 
the perennial impetus for social change. However, the transnationality of the political 
sphere has complicated the system in hierarchal and bureaucratic ways, and has 
maintained its patriarchal undertone, but yet there is seemingly an expansion of 
opportunity structures that are ready to support activists and women’s advocacy 
groups in their continual fight. In Lebanon, the dominant corporatist elitist structures 
have proven to buttress the very system that offends women’s rights. These structures 
discussed thus will offer advancement to the women’s movement as long as they are 
keen to mobilize through it and internalize the contention this system has neatly 
packaged for consumption. Sociologist William Gamson (1992) argues that collective 
action is structured by “ideological packages.” The ideology behind this very 
movement, however, is imported from a supranational system that ultimately benefits 
the most developed nation-states with strong, democratic institutions. Therefore, its 
ideology is not yet fit for Lebanon’s consumption.7172  
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71 In response to pressure to pass legislation in Lebanon under the comprehensive framework of the 
U.N. convention, CEDAW, “Lebanon’s highest Sunni Muslim authority, Grand Mufti Sheikh 
Mohammad Qabbani, rejected a proposed law to protect women from domestic violence as a Western 
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In this section, the overlying argument introduced the concept of 
transnationalism, and proposed its inception in Lebanon’s women’s movement as a 
means of supranational influence on the post-war, developing climate. Although since 
Beijing an international political opportunity structure has enabled the growth of 
women’s advocacy NGOs, this growth is but a number that presents an exponential 
admittance of activists into civil society. A lack of output on behalf of legislating 
women’s rights policies continues to be a source of contention. Today the NCLW’s 
role has been mainly supportive, and simultaneously restrictive, as the umbrella 
organization for mobilizing associational organizations in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement to transnationalist heights, as noticed in the joint UNFPA and NCLW 
campaign to institutionalize women’s rights and formulate the National Strategy for 
Women in Lebanon 2011-2021.  
The state contention that ensues will follow with a process of externalizing 
contention. In the following section, externalized contention will be discussed as a 
means that has solidified a structure of reliance between Lebanon’s women’s 
movement and internationalist support. In this process, the section will explain the 
dynamics of Lebanon’s women’s movement, followed by a thesis on the new divisive 
force between the women’s movement and the spur of a transnational feminist 
movement. 
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threat to Islamic family values” (Mahdawi, 6 July 2011, Retrieved from 
http://www.ginsc.net/main.php?option=view_article&mode=0&article=18123&lang=en).  
72 Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden have condemned Lebanon for incompatible and 
inadmissible claims against CEDAW. A detailed transcript of objections to Lebanon’s reservations can 
be accessed from  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N36 
 55 
4.3 – Externalizing Contention for Transnational Impacts on 
Lebanon’s Women’s Movement  
The long standing impasse between patriarchal elites and women’s advocacy 
groups has proven that, regardless of the structural and transnational associational ties 
between international support and domestic civil society, the national political climate 
continues to be impassable for legislating women’s rights. The section argues that the 
women’s movement has not gained esteem in the advent of transnationalism in 
Lebanon. Visibility of the women’s movement’s expansion into transnational realms 
includes women’s advocacy groups, civil society organizations and NGOs with 
partnerships between the international and supranational agencies. However, the 
benefits that civil society generates from such cooperative, transnational associational 
ties should not be sought as a reflection of the overall status of women’s rights.   
Regardless of the stagnation, transnationalism has taken a stronghold within 
the women’s movement. That is, Lebanon’s women’s movement has found a 
grounding of support from supranational bodies and agencies to mobilize campaigns 
for women’s rights. But, along this path to transnationality, the women’s movement 
has become further mainstreamed and enmeshed in a “dynamic process of figuration 
and reconfiguration of interactions” from a structure of grassroots organizing to 
corporatist, associational cooperative ties with state-aligned women’s organization. 
7374 The broad configuration of the women’s movement, albeit, has not changed. For 
one, the state maintains its status as the ultimate offender of women’s rights. In return, 
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73 Von Bülow, 2010, p. 5 
74 Pre-existing literature on Lebanon’s women’s movement provides documentation on the 
organizational structures of women’s advocacy groups up until 2010. The National Lebanese Council 
of Women, one of the long-standing advocacy groups, “emerged as a corporatist umbrella structure 
sponsored by the state which limited women’s rights agenda to one enabling women to participate in 
the social and economic spheres and increase their political participation” (Khattab, 2010, p. 8; Pratt, 
2006, p. 82). 
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assimilating to the hierarchal integration with the state, the women’s movement has 
only exacerbated Lebanese patriarchal chauvinism.   
Scholars have depicted the dim future of Lebanon’s women’s movement as a 
pyramid built by features of the top-down, statist centric approach. Wherein, the 
appeal of legitimacy from state and international bodies, along with the carrot and 
stick of funding and acceptance into a mainstream civil society, has been proven too 
seductive to ignore. Internalized contention and its supposed remedy by U.N. 
agencies have swayed activists towards assimilation rather than enhancing prospects 
of a true grassroots movement that addresses the fundamental social issues in 
Lebanon. For a country governed by deep-seated patriarchal norms and inherent 
political contention, the implications are grave when civil society assimilates to the 
structures of statist-centered, hegemonic institutions.   
This section argues that the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) under Security Council Resolution 132575 
has provided the “ideological package” for women’s advocacy groups to organize in a 
transnational scope. The mechanism of internalized contention has brought forth the 
transnational feature in Lebanon’s women’s movement. Where this structure of 
organization is largely built around CEDAW’s transnationality, the convention’s 
connectedness to supranational influence, and its domestic appeal for women’s 
liberation from discriminatory offenses simultaneously instigated an opportunity 
structure for contentious politics between women’s aspirations for women’s rights 
and the patriarchal system’s lack of consensus. The latter feature of political 
discrimination has driven Lebanon’s women’s movement to employ the mechanism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Lebanon signed the U.N. Convention in 2000, with reservations against article 9 (2) and articles 16 
(1) (c) (d) (f) and (g) (Division for the Advancement of Women. (2009). Declarations, reservations, 
and objections to CEDAW (UN Publications). New York: United Nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N36). 
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of externalized contention to seek resourceful venues beyond the state under claims of 
a repressive system.    
In this section, externalizing contention is described as a mechanism for 
women’s advocacy groups to widen the international political opportunity structure 
for Lebanon’s women’s movement. I argue, however, this mechanism of externalizing 
contention further implicates the status quo relationship between Lebanon’s civil 
society, NCLW, the U.N. and even as distant as Lebanon-U.S. relations on “women’s 
rights are human rights” polices.  
In Lebanon, externalized contention is directed at both contentions with the 
state’s reservations on articles 9 and 16, and its total refusal to ratify legislations, and 
towards the committee of CEDAW. Contention against the latter body largely regards 
the committee’s lackluster efforts to provide a framework of CEDAW exemplary and 
applicable for Lebanon’s culture, society, and political system. This contention has 
come forth as an admission from objections and condemnation of Western countries 
against Lebanon’s “incompatible and inadmissible” claims for CEDAW.  
To deconstruct externalized contention as a social movement mechanism, it is 
imperative to discuss the concept of frame bridging and frame transformation, 
sequences that drive “social movements [to] align their claims with relevant social 
publics.”76 U.N. institutionalization of CEDAW is symbolic of the internalized 
contention that has given rise to campaigns for women’s rights in Lebanon. Its 
discourse represents the framing of liberation as the “universal bill of rights for 
women” and is further “constructed by movement organizers to attract supporters, 
signal their intentions, and gain media attention”7778 as the righteous framework that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Tarrow, 2005, pp. 61-62 
77 Division for the Advancement of Women. (2009). Declarations, reservations, and objections to 
CEDAW (UN Publications). New York: United Nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N36 
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will emancipate Lebanese women from state induced oppression.  
Women’s rights activist, Lina Abou Habib, founder of a woman’s advocacy 
group in Lebanon, the Collective for Research & Training on Development—Action 
(CRDT-A), and advising partner to Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, 
Development, & Peace (WLP), depicts the profoundness of CEDAW’s framing 
within Lebanon’s women’s movement: 
“The Campaign's starting point and main asset is the ratification of the Convention by 
Arab States. This provided a powerful and legitimate tool to hold Arab states 
responsible for making women rights and gender equality a reality….As an 
international Women Learning Partnership, we celebrated last year the 30th 
anniversary of CEDAW and organized public events at the CSW 54th meeting in 
New York. Our intent was to demonstrate the extent to which CEDAW had given us 
drive, power, ammunition and international legitimacy to advocate for rights and 
equality. Our struggle is to make CEDAW a reality for all women in the region and to 
make this convention a binding one….CEDAW remains the only Convention that 
focuses on women's rights. It still by far surpasses the provisions of other 
Conventions and has been instrumental for women's movements the world over in 
advocating for rights and recognition.” 79 
 
CEDAW is a U.N. drafted convention that has stood for the women’s movement as 
both a tool for framing grievances and for framing transformation of Lebanon’s future 
for women’s rights. However, the technique of translating framing from bridging 
support for women’s rights and employing the assistance received in response 
(externalized contention) followed by transformation is precisely where Lebanon’s 
women’s movement has broken down in the face of state hegemony.  
Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford (1986) coined the symbiotic mechanism 
of frame bridging and frame transformation as the features in a social movement that 
provide “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” and “frame 
transformation which involves the planting and nurturing of new values, jettisoning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Tarrow, 2005, p. 61; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992 
79 Abou Habib, L. (2010, November 17).  Appeal to US on CEDAW from Lebanon. Retrieved from 
http://www.learningpartnership.org/lib/appeal-us-cedaw-lebanon 
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old ones, and reframing erroneous beliefs and misframings.”80 
The mechanism of frame bridging brought forth a grassroots movement in 
support of CEDAW by Lebanon’s women’s advocacy groups In building the 
women’s movement in Lebanon around a civil society of women’s advocacy groups, 
campaigns to remove reservations from CEDAW rallied activists, scholars, and 
organizations around its specific issues. Grassroots campaigns and protests focused on 
KAFA’s draft law, The  
Law to Protect Women from Violence to eliminate gender-based violence and protect 
women, CRTD-A’s campaign for Nationality laws, LLWR’s variation on CRTD-A’s 
campaign with an additional emphasis on article 9 of CEDAW, and the UNDP-
CFUWI coalition, with additional support from LWDG, LWC, LCRVAW.81   
From the perspective of state-level analysis, Khattab (2010) attributes the 
fragmentation seen in grassroots organizing as a failure to launch a Gramscian ‘war of 
position’ against the sectarian regime. However, from the perspective of 
internationalism, the disunity of grassroots organizing has failed to produce 
campaigns that engaged the target public through campaigns with Gramscian 
‘common sense’. According to Tarrow (2005), for a transnational campaign to 
successfully translate global framing into local framing, movement organizers must 
be both consumers of resources and producers of new ones relevant to the target 
demographic:  
“Proposing frames that are new and challenging but still resonate with existing 
cultural understandings is a delicate balancing act, especially since society’s 
‘common sense’ buttresses the position of elites and defends inherited inequalities. It 
is particularly problematic where activists attempt to import symbols and forms of 
action from abroad.”82 
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80 Tarrow, 2005, p. 61; Snow et al., 1986, p. 467 
81 Khattab, 2010, pp. 140-143 
82 Tarrow, 2005, p. 61 
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Organizations and associational leaders of women’s advocacy groups were not 
inherently hostile with each other, but the difficulty of unpacking an imported 
framework such as CEDAW into a mostly traditional and patriarchal society was a 
daunting task that required cooperation among individuals and groups in the women’s 
movement.  
Yet, consensus amongst women’s advocacy groups is but one facet to the 
success of translating the global frame of CEDAW for women’s human rights into a 
local frame. Aside from consensus amongst the minority that is the women’s 
movement, for CEDAW and to gain a national social movement in favor of women’s 
rights, movement organizers and activists would have to promote common sense 
framing to the wider society of Lebanese. This task is further exacerbated by the 
opinion of ruling elites, who attest to an infringement of CEDAW’s ‘Western’ 
dimensions, and demand reservations on articles 9,83 16,84 and 29,85 (which dictate 
nationality, women and family, and authorization to supranational arbitration on state 
party disagreements over CEDAW interpretation).86  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Reservation on article 9 include (2): States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with 
respect to the nationality of their children. 
84 Reservations on article 16 include: (1) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular 
shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (c) The same rights and responsibilities during 
marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters 
relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (f) The same 
rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, 
or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the 
children shall be paramount; (g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
85 Reservation of paragraph 2 in reference to paragraph 1 of article 29: (1) Any dispute between two or 
more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not 
settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six 
months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of 
the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by 
request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. (2) Each State Party may at the time of signature or 
ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound 
by paragraph I of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect 
to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 
86 At Beijing, Randa Berri, wife of long standing Speaker of Lebanon’s Parliament and sectarian 
warlord, Nabih Berri, “went as far as to deny that domestic violence existed in Lebanon, and that it was 
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Khattab further cites “the weakening of state institutions” as the driving force 
that lead grassroots women’s organizations KAFA and CRTD-A to rely on “the 
sectarian leaders’ consent to their proposed laws.”87  
When funding towards various campaigns led to a polarized community 
within the women’s movement, it seemed institutionalizing the movement under the 
NCLW and dispersing funding solely through this organization presented an 
alternative approach.  
However, before this consolidation took place for the drafting of a ten-year 
strategy for women’s “affairs” in Lebanon, the transnational movement was 
fragmented with rivalry between groups and for externalized support. Khattab (2010) 
details the polarization that previously existed amongst women’s advocacy groups for 
the women’s movement, where:  
“…grassroots organizations whether professional or voluntary-based have tried to 
create avenues to assess, reach out and address the basic needs of underserved 
women. Despite these praiseworthy efforts, they have failed to come together and act 
as a counter-hegemonic force against the sectarian status quo. Hence, single-issue 
based associations with a limited constituency and number of supporters cannot lead 
the change alone.”88 
While Khattab’s observations date back only two years, the women’s movement has 
since attempted to resolve any contention in organizing amongst women’s advocacy 
groups. The cited schism at the time between the women’s advocacy groups and 
NGOs, KAFA, CRTD-A, LLWR, and LWG was duly noted as a product of 
“competition over funding” as each advocacy group specialized on a narrow issue for 
women’s rights. 89  
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only a problem in the West…this statement came after pressure was exerted by religious figures to 
drop the issue [of domestic violence]” (Bray-Collins, 2003, p. 95). 
87 Khattab, 2010, p. 145 
88 Khattab, 2010, p.125 
89 Khattab, 2010, p.143 
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The departure of this study from that of Khattab’s analysis90 asserts, rather, the 
evil effect on the impetus of a social movement can be disorganization amongst the 
various women’s groups within the women’s movement as a whole. The climate of 
activism during the formidable years of transnationalism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement was largely fragmented over disorganization and heated with rivalry 
between associational leaders who believed in grassroots organizing as a protest for 
secularism and elite women with corporatist alliance with sectarian members of 
parliament. Disorganization preceded rivalry as each women’s advocacy group 
specialized in campaigning towards a narrow interest, rather than to consolidate 
constituents, grassroots mobilization, and funding towards a comprehensive social 
movement. In return, the ruling cartels and sectarian decision-makers were able to 
exploit the bounty of efforts by women’s rights activists and civil society actors with 
claimants of promoting “politicized issues” and submitting “incomplete” draft laws 
that need “to be reformulated more precisely so that it does not contradict with other 
effective laws.”91 
Thus Lebanon’s women’s movement, though transnational in scope, can be 
more likened to a “Lebanese oddity” of transnational activism.92 Its aberration is 
arguably consequential of employing externalized contention on two levels, not 
harmoniously, but rather in varied, disorganized, and seemingly competitive 
sequences. The implication of this breakdown raises doubts of the unity in Lebanon’s 
women’s movement.93 This stark disunity, however, is not a recent occurrence. 
Rather, transnationalism of women’s advocacy groups and internalization of civil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 For a detailed account of Lebanon’s women’s movement from a state-level analysis see Lara Khattab 
(2010) “Civil society in a sectarian context: The women’s movement post-war Lebanon.” 
91 Khattab, 2010, p. 155 & p. 171 
92 My sincerest regards are to my thesis advisor, mentor, and sometimes counselor, Dr. Jennifer Skulte-
Ouaiss, for coining the phrase, “Lebanese oddity,” and when I could not articulate the intensity of my 
ideas into a coherent sentence during those last minutes before the hour of deadline.  
93 Khattab (2010) and Bray-Collins (2003) attest to the polarization in Lebanon’s women’s movement. 
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society as a whole have perpetuated a long-standing polarization in the face of 
competitive funding. It is noticeable this breakdown within the women’s movement 
intensified whenever a different associational leader of a women’s advocacy group 
proposed a new campaign. The ironic rivalry that ensued in externalizing contention 
between the grassroots groups, CRTD-A, KAFA, LLWR, and LWG occurred in the 
midst of institution building between the UNFPA and NCLW.  
The NCLW, though arguably a national organization, risks becoming just a 
committee of displaced (and weak) oversight and accountability for transnational 
policies on women’s rights. Rather than allocating responsibility to the state, where 
the centralized power of decision-making rests, the U.N. has only expanded its 
boundary of institutionalization through the NCLW. In this form of organization, any 
contention regarding women’s issues between the state and the U.N. is displaced to 
the NCLW and its community of women’s advocacy NGOs. In return, the decision-
makers continue to benefit from the unchallenged “salience of state apparatuses” of 
sectarianism and patriarchy.94    
When women’s groups could not form a consensus for movement 
organization over at least the nationality law, allegiance to the state and power of 
party politics did inevitably overshadow their campaigns. However, and most notably, 
movement organizers received a dismal reaction to grassroots mobilization even in 
public demonstrations. Indeed, associational leaders of women’s advocacy groups 
colluded with parliamentarian members’ over public support. It is pertinent to briefly 
describe the allegiance of citizenry to the sectarian, confessional system. Lebanese are 
majorly divided between political movements headed by long-time patriarchal 
warlords. The overwhelming majority of political participation is either for the March 
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94 Evans, Skocpol, Rueshchmeyer, 1993, p. 193  
 64 
8 or March 14 bloc. Thus, even grassroots mobilization for sectarian causes and 
national interests overshadow support for the women’s movement, which largely 
consists of secular grassroots organizations.95  
In their failure to reconcile for solidarity and mobilize a formidable grassroots 
movement, the women’s movement became further entrenched in fitna and fawda, or 
civil strife and chaos.  
Further, when the grassroots movements failed to achieve the overt goals of 
amended laws, the women’s movement externalized contention away from grassroots 
campaigns and towards supranational support for institution building within the 
framework of sectarianism. The configurations of the NCLW, its associational 
women’s advocacy groups and the culmination of the National Strategy for Women, 
2011-2021 is part of a larger attempt to build an institution for women’s rights and 
human rights. Wherein, what seemed to be the last standing disillusioned grassroots 
organizations in Lebanon, KAFA, CRTD-A, LLWR, and LWG,96 are now recognized 
as stakeholders within the NCLW as “The stakeholders that have participated to the 
validation meeting of the National Ten-Year Strategy for women’s Affairs in 
Lebanon.”97  
In 2012, many of the women’s advocacy groups that were once regarded as 
marginalized by the NCLW and LCW, national committees that consists of “elitist 
women [who] played an influential role in pushing ahead safe agendas, silencing 
grassroots women’ s organizations and dividing the women’ s movement” are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Triggered by the February 14, 2005 assassination of politician Rafiq Hariri, the largest and most 
successful social movements in Lebanon have been under the 2005 protests Intifadat Al Istiqlal, or 
commonly refereed to as the Independence Uprising Beirut Spring, to demand the release of Syrian 
hegemony. The protests that ensued would create the anti-Syrian March 8 bloc and pro-Syrian March 
14 bloc. I stress these protests were successful according to Tarrow’s process of externalizing 
contention: demonstrators ultimately achieved their overt goals. 
96 Khattab, 2010, succinctly categorized these women’s advocacy groups/NGOs as grassroots with 
pragmatic to critical relationships with elites. 
97 NCLW, National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021, p. 6 
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seemingly integrated into a newly manicured, consolidated institution under the 
succinct heading of “National Commission for Lebanese Women in cooperation with 
United Nations Fund for Development.”98  
Tarrow (2005) and Keck & Sikkink (1998) may explain this process of 
consolidating organizational partnerships under the heading of a single institution as: 
“[An] alternative to the two-level game that we called ‘the boomerang effect,’ where 
non state actors, faced with repression and blockage at home, seek out state and non 
state allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to 
bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change.”99  
 
The international contention for women’s rights in Lebanon is largely within 
the benign structure of the NCLW, where it serves as a national representative of 
women in Lebanon and an executive body of women’s advocacy NGOs that are 
recognized as part of civil society. Thus, the women’s movement in Lebanon has 
extended so far as “collective action framing” will mobilize activists of civil society 
within this umbrella organization.100 That is to say, the transnationality of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement can spur other collective movements of action, transnational 
activism, and reactive grassroots movement, however, the site of contention between 
the international and domestic will always return to collision at this juncture.  
As it will be argued in the latter half of this chapter, transnationality has also 
provided opportunities for externalized contention to build horizontal, transnational 
coalitions between grassroots organizations in Lebanon’s women’s movement with 
Women’s Learning Partnership (WLP), Women for Women’s Human Rights 
(WWHR), and the Coalition for Sexual Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR) in 
junction with Resurj, along with grassroots funding from Women’s Fund (WF) and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Khattab, 2010, p. 107 
99 Tarrow, 2005, p.145 
100 Tarrow, 2005, p. 61 
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Association for Women in Development (AWID). Johnson & McCarthy (2003) offer 
a theoretical assertion of causation between transnationality and national grassroots 
movement, wherein the expanding international opportunity structures can be 
conducive for enabling a momentum of national movements: 
“A clear theoretical specification of appropriate mechanisms by which the founding 
of transnational populations might spur the founding of national ones and visa-versa 
is embedded in conceptions of the appropriate boundaries of wider institutional fields 
and communities.”101 
 
This study points to an existing causation between transnational building of an 
umbrella institution in Lebanon for women and the spur of a transnational feminist 
movement by a community of grassroots activists who are largely alienated by the 
NCLW and UNFPA.  
Since Beijing, Lebanon’s women’s movement has attempted to follow a path 
of transnationality, but has failed to sustain itself as a truly grassroots movement. 
Rather, along this path to transnationality, this chapter argues that the women’s 
movement became fragmented due to inherent features of rivalry for funding between 
women’s groups, differing allegiances to secular or sectarian ideologies, the 
confessional, sectarian state of Lebanon, which include: patriarchal stalemate, male 
chauvinism, and a society of Lebanese who only mobilize in mass numbers to 
sheepishly support political parties within the two dictating blocs, March 8 or March 
14.  
Until now, the desired outcome for externalizing contention has been met 
exclusively for the NCLW. Throughout its partnership with UNFPA, the NCLW has 
established grounding as the sole “machinery” driving the women’s movement.102  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Johnson & McCarthy, 2003, p. 6 
102 According to the consultancy terms of reference on the action plan for gender enhancement and 
mainstreaming, “The National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) is the main national women 
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The achievements that belie women’s empowerment and advancement in 
Lebanon up through 2012 are largely under the heading of transnational partnerships 
with UNFPA. Through UNFPA, selective groups, institutions, and NGOs, including 
KAFA and most notably the NCLW have been receiving funding and assistance on 
projects in the following program areas: reproductive health and rights, population 
and development, humanitarian response, and gender equality and women’s 
empowerment. While most projects last between one or two years, UNFPA 
appropriated the most effort to implementing projects to buildup the NCLW’s 
capacity as the organizing body of the “mainstream”103 women’s movement.104 The 
touted structure of the women’s movement has gone from a combination of various 
women’s advocacy groups to a formidable, state-centric, institution. Institutional 
organization and state approved mechanisms of the women’s movement for 
campaigns that address “gender equality, equity and women empowerment” may 
prove to only be shallow attempts at “enhancing the institutional capacities of 
NCLW” rather than to challenge the fabric of institutional sexism, patriarchy, and 
gender inequality.105  
In discussing the structure of the contemporary women’s movement in 
Lebanon, as it stands before the 2013 national elections and before a potential 2015 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
machinery entrusted with providing guidance and advice to all national and international actors 
concerned with promoting gender equality and empowerment of women” (NCLW, Consultancy Terms 
of Reference, Retrieved from http://www.nclw.org.lb/pictures/News/Consultancy2012.pdf).  
103 I utilize the term “mainstream” to categorize long-standing women’s advocacy organizations in 
Lebanon who are 1) officially recognized by the Lebanese state as a Non-governmental organization 
(NGO) 2) and work alongside the official steering committee on women’s issue, the NCLW.!
104 Beginning with WE PASS, to implement SCR 1325 after the July 2006 War, a UNFPA-NCLW 
partnership received funding of  $994,858 from various U.N. bodies and EU countries (UNDP, 31 May 
2011, Fourth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Lebanon 
Recovery Fund.) 
105 By funding the NCLW over a span of three years under the program area of gender equality, equity 
and women empowerment, UNFPA funding between 2007-2010 aimed at institutionalizing civil 
society of women’s advocacy groups under the direction of NCLW (Retrieved from 
http://www.unfpa.org.lb/PROGRAMME-AREAS/Gender-Equality-and-Women-
Empowerment/National-Commission-for-Lebanese-Women.aspx). 
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Fifth World Conference in Qatar,106 the sequence of framing its ideological basis and 
reconfiguring its structure of mobilization is best analyzed alongside the rhetoric of 
the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon, 2011-2021. Since Beijing, and 
throughout Lebanon’s history as a participant in international forums, the National 
Strategy for Women in Lebanon has served as an official framework for a national 
and local agenda to implement transnational policies on women’s rights. However, 
when analyzing the agenda in the context of Lebanon’s political climate and 
patriarchal, sectarian structure, the National Strategy reads more as empty rhetoric 
than an applicable framework. 
Regardless, the transnational force behind CEDAW has initiated a revival of 
Lebanon’s women’s movement with vertical, supranational support between the 
NCLW and its civil society affiliates107 with “partnerships” “stakeholders” and 
“gender focal points” with various, respective bodies of power (partnerships 
consisting of UNFPA, ILO, UNODC, OHCHR, FAO, ESCWA, UNESCO, European 
Union, Italian Embassy and “gender focal points in the following ministries, public 
administrations and councils: ministry of Tourism, ministry of Defense, ministry of 
Finance, ministry of Energy and Water, ministry of Higher Education, ministry of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 According to the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), “On March 8, 2012 the 
President of the United Nations General Assembly H.E. Mr. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser and the 
Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon jointly proposed convening a Fifth World Conference on 
Women (5th WCW) in Qatar in 2015.  The proposal has to go before the 193-member General 
Assembly (GA) for final approval, and its proponents hope that this will be advanced during the 66th 
session of the GA.” (AWID, About the fifth World Conference on Women, Retrieved from 
http://awid.org/News-Analysis/Fifth-World-Conference-on-Women-in-2015). 
107 The National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021, responsible for overseeing social 
awareness of CEDAW, refers to civil society actors as stakeholders: “The stakeholders that have 
participated to the validation meeting of the National Ten-Year Strategy for women’s Affairs in 
Lebanon are the following: Lebanese Women Democratic Gathering, Lebanese Council to Resist 
Violence against Woman (Lecorvaw), National meeting for the elimination of discrimination against 
women, kafa (enough) violence and exploitation, Azm and Saade Association, National committee for 
the follow up on women’s issues, Lebanese council of women, Safadi Foundation, YWCA Young 
women Christian Association, League of Working women in Lebanon, League for Lebanese women’s 
rights, Lebanon family planning association for development and family empowerment (LFPADE), 
Caritas, CRTDA, Saint-Joseph University, Women Committee in Beirut Bar Association, Chamber of 
trade, industry and agriculture of Beirut and Mount Lebanon (NCLW, National Strategy for Women in 
Lebanon 2011-2021, p. 6)” 
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Interior and Municipalities, ministry of Environment, ministry of Social Affairs, 
ministry of Foreign Affairs, ministry of Information , ministry of Displaced, ministry 
of Industry, ministry of Economy and Trade, Economic and Social council, Council 
for development and reconstruction, Central administration of Statistics, Center for 
educational research and development, Presidency of Council of ministers, Civil 
defense”).108  
Although the mainstream women’s movement did initially follow a 
transnational path to becoming a society of civil organizations and NGOs, the 
“Lebanese oddity” of unique cultural, social, and political features steered the 
character of the women’s movement towards institution building, and perhaps with 
the intent for structuring a democratic institution.109 The prevailing institutional 
feature has supplanted mainstream women’s advocacy groups from civil society into a 
political society. The looming question behind this transference beckons whether this 
will become the new model of women’s participation in Lebanon’s political sphere. Is 
the façade of neoliberalism as an institutional structure equated with development and 
democracy? Will the structure of the NCLW continue to entice women to join its 
ranks?  
Noted grassroots organizations that were once marginalized have seemed to 
now align with the state and U.N. partnerships. This next section describes a vacuum 
in the grassroots social movement community, where a pocket of opportunity has 
risen to mobilize activists who are redefining the transnational structure of Lebanon’s 
mainstream women’s movement. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 NCLW, 2011, National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021 
109 An argument of Lebanon’s flawed approach to building a democratic institution of women’s 
organizing will be detailed in Chapter Five when discussion of a feminist grassroots collective reveals 
the exclusivity of the NCLW-UNFPA partnership. 
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4.4 – Against Hegemonic Interests: The Call to Reaffirm Grassroots 
Organizing 
Shou ya3ni banat akhir zaman? 
You probably have heard this phrase before– maybe someone has referred to you as one of 
‘banat akhir zaman’, and it wasn’t exactly meant as a compliment. Banat akhir zaman, or 
“the girls of the last times,” are supposedly so different from the generations of women 
before us, so much more unruly and rebellious, or so we are told. The fact is, if your elders 
don’t understand your way of life and don’t like the way you dress, your attitude, the way you 
think and the way you behave, they will probably call you a bint akhir zaman. 
So, we’ve decided that since we’re not ashamed of who we are and what we believe 
in, we are going to reclaim that label and turn it into an empowering name for all of us who 
are working, in whatever way we can, towards the personal liberation of women and the end 
of all discrimination against them, and therefore towards the general betterment of society. 
Banat Akhir Zaman are all you girls and women who feel different, who defy the traditional 
mindsets and ways of behaving that society has assigned you, and who are working, or who 
want to work, towards making a positive change in the world. 
 
In 2008, an inkling of change began to show within the blogosphere of a 
feminist grassroots movement. Banat Akhir Zaman was the first attempt at a 
grassroots campaign for women’s bodily rights. A group of independent, feminist 
activists noticed a gap in action for women’s bodily and sexual rights within the 
mainstream women’s movements in Lebanon. According to a Beirut-based, Lebanese 
activist, Banat Akhir Zamaan began as a loosely networked movement for “an 
organization of the entire Arab world, not only in Lebanon. [It] Organizes between 
five and six thousand girls.”110 
Almost two decades on its “pathways of transnationality,” a new structure of 
organizing activists has emerged to challenge the long-standing, prototypical 
character of women’s advocacy groups.111 The apparent shift in organization has 
taken place from a “market structure or hierarchically based governance structure,” to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 An English translation was transcribed from the original publication in Spanish (Retrieved from 
http://raoninfo.blogspot.com/2008/11/articulao-feminista-do-cone-sul-ao.html). 
111 Von Bülow, 2010, p. 25 
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a method of horizontal organization for a network society of transnational collective 
action.112 
Further, in the twenty-first century, the usage of social media outlets has 
become imperative for a collective social movement to establish itself. Eminent 
documentarian and social activist George Stoney succinctly suggests, “Social change 
comes with the use of social media and getting people… involved”.113 This aspect of 
social media connectedness is a mainstay feature of social movements, and especially 
transnational in scope.  
The collective of feminist activists in Lebanon’s Banat Akhir Zaman sought to 
reinstate a grassroots movement at a time when leftist, secular, and grassroots 
organizations were muddled in the fragmented structure of the mainstream women’s 
movement. At the time Banat Akhir Zaman emerged in the blogosphere, women’s 
advocacy NGO KAFA began “campaigning for change [away violence against 
women] at both the parliamentary and social levels.” However, campaigning at the 
social level would not be executed until “Once the draft law is finalized [then] KAFA 
intends to begin a grassroots campaign.”114 
As a direct critique to its campaign implementation, a grassroots activist 
questioned in a blog: “At the end, KAFA seems to be doing a great job, but I do 
wonder why they’re separating their grassroots campaign from their work with the 
legislators? Wouldn’t it be more effective if they worked on both levels 
simultaneously?”115 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Von Bülow, 2010, p. 29-30 
113 Stoney, G. (2005, September 30). Local public access TV under attack from trio of congressional 
bills. Democracy Now! Retrieved from 
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/9/30/local_public_access_tv_under_attack  
114 Clark, S. (2008, June 8). Lebanese women still vulnerable to violence 
115 Banat Akhir Zaman. (2008, June 10). And still we ask: Why isn’t there a law against domestic 
violence already? Banat Akhir Zaman Blog. Retrieved from 
http://banatakhirzaman.wordpress.com/2008/06/10/and-still-we-ask-why-isn’t-there-a-law-against-
domestic-violence-already/ 
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This statement reveals an implicit schism within the organization of the 
women’s movement. As mentioned before, a great aspect to the fragmentation was an 
inability to organize a mass grassroots movement around the campaign of women’s 
rights. Instead, mainstream women’s advocacy groups organized grassroots 
movement in relation to their own respective campaigns. The pitfall of this frame 
bridging hinders collective identity from diffusing throughout the movement, and is 
instead maintained with communities closest to the movement organizers. At the 
onset, at least for KAFA, funding was critical to support their partnership with 
legislators. This placed greater emphasis to work with national institutions first, rather 
than with activists.   
Nonetheless, these perceived failures on behalf of feminist activists led to 
realignment to grassroots activism. In effect, the transnational feature of a subculture 
(or perhaps a counterculture) within the women’s movement transformed from 
transnational in structure to transnational in ideology and collective identity.  
Chapter Five will present a case study of grassroots, transnational feminist 
organizing in Lebanon’s women’s movement. The overlying argument will describe 
the spur of a national movement for transnational feminist activism as a reproach to 
the institutional consolidation of women’s advocacy groups without furthering 
women’s rights.  
 
4.5 – Conclusion 
In summary, the chapter provided an overview and analysis of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement from national to transnational since the post-1975-1990 period 
began. The prevailing argument asserts that even transnational woman’s advocacy 
groups, as products of a top-down global approach, are not conducive to challenging 
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the patriarchal political system, whether at a state or international level. However, 
from this stagnancy, and by the diffusion of transnational feminism from a revival of 
bottom-up grassroots movement, an emerging transnational feminist collective has 
been (re)born, albeit on the fringe of Lebanon’s mainstream women’s movement.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DIFFUSION OF TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST 
TIES: ORGANIZING NASAWIYA 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 In a study of Lebanon’s women’s advocacy groups, Bray-Collins (2003) 
investigated the structure of the women’s movement at a time when discourse of 
women’s rights was just emerging in civil society. The details of these observations 
discern a temporality when transnational activism and feminism, too, were largely 
absent from organizing. Post-2006 War and at the height of transnational intervention 
for human rights, Khattab (2010) provided timely observations of the effects of 
transnational funding for Lebanon’s women’s movement. By 2010, feminists in 
Lebanon had begun to organize independently and alongside prominent women’s 
advocacy groups KAFA and CRTD-A on campaigns against gender-based violence 
and nationality laws. In these two case studies, when feminist discourse was present 
in grassroots movement, campaigns for personal status and citizenship laws were 
brought to the forefront to organize campaigns for women’s rights.   
The most evocative discernments between Bray-Collins and Khattab’s studies 
that drive the proceeding arguments in this chapter rest upon two facts: Feminist 
activists continue to be on the fringe of Lebanon’s mainstream women’s movement; 
while, discourse on the plight of sectarianism against women’s rights continues to be 
simultaneously absent from the mainstream women’s movement. This is the opening 
through which Nasawiya emerged. 
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5.2 – Nasawiya: A New Faction in Lebanon’s Women’s Movement 
As discussed in Chapter Four, women’s advocacy groups of the mainstream 
women’s movement have been consolidated under state institutions. However, the 
transformation is largely a cosmetic substitution to its previous form of fragmentation. 
Although structural features have been adjusted to accommodate new transnational 
partnerships with the UNFPA, the mainstream women’s movement seemingly still 
resonates with a notion of being “an aging movement, that has not been able to 
increase its constituency, nor update its discourse.”116 The languished women’s 
movement and lack of strides towards civil laws to protect women’s rights are 
particular failures on behalf of an unresponsive state. My analysis attempts to 
emphasize the state as the greatest offender to the women’s movement. I cannot, 
however, discredit mainstream women’s advocacy groups with broad strokes of 
skepticism. It is undeniably, and at least a partial failure on behalf of women’s 
advocacy organizations when their efforts and campaigns have not produced enough 
mobilization and organization amongst themselves to pressure their political 
representatives to a noticeable degree.  
This chapter will orient the feminist collective Nasawiya within Lebanon’s 
women’s movement as a grassroots, bottom-up social movement. Due to its structure 
as a loose network of activists, Nasawiya is highlighted as a social movement, and not 
similar in its organizational structure to existing women’s advocacy groups within 
Lebanon’s purportedly mainstream women’s movement. 
Between Nasawiya and other women’s advocacy groups in the women’s 
movement, the largest difference lies in the campaign approaches and discourse 
surrounding “initiatives,” or grassroots projects enacted by an individual or group of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Bray-Collins, 2003, p. 53; Al Rassed, 2000, p. 2 
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activists from the collective. In this chapter I will delineate the various initiatives and 
campaigns instigated by Nasawiya activists thus far. Before discussing this portion in 
detail I will further explain pitfalls on behalf of woman’s advocacy groups to mobilize 
activists. In accordance, I will address pitfalls in organizing Nasawiya. 
The case of the top-down, mainstream women’s movement headed by the 
NCLW-UNFPA partnership does provide an interesting example of rhetoric changes 
as an attempt to align women’s advocacy groups under a single campaign agenda. 
Actors of the mainstream women’s movement and authors of the National Strategy 
for Women in Lebanon, 2011-2021, updated the national rhetoric for women’s rights 
campaigns to include thematic references of women and gender. This is a direct 
adoption of a systematic overhaul for “political correctness” on behalf of the U.N. and 
since the adoption of SCR 1325.117 By upholding the assumption that international 
campaigns affect domestic political opportunity structures, a critical approach is used 
to consider policy aspirations under Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 in 
Lebanon.118 A meta-analysis based on a quantitative study from Black (2009) 
quantifies the mention of SCR 1325 in resolution references in Lebanon, wherein 
Lebanon has adopted six resolutions in references of SCR 1325 between 2000 and 
2009. Black’s analysis concludes that U.N. policies have changed policy rhetoric 
from depicting women as victims to including gender mainstreamed language for 
women as active agents in peace building, governance, peace negotiations, and post-
conflict peace building. Although U.N. rhetoric is adopting gender mainstreaming, 
Black’s data posits that ultimately gender themes in country-specific resolutions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Black, 2009, p. 20 
118 United Nations Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1325 Women, Peace, & 
Security on October 31, 2000 to call for inclusive resolutions for women to be active participants in 
post-conflict environments. Although the resolution attempts to reorient the image of women from 
victims of war to agents of peace, international campaigns fail to delineate the importance of 
overcoming cultural constructs of gender.  
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continue to fluctuate – an indication that gender mainstreaming is often diluted in the 
process of state legislation.  
Black (2009) denotes this overhaul has led to a dramatic increase of U.N. 
resolutions in reference to women as active agents of peace building. According to 
Black: 
“The generally high percentage of recent resolutions containing some SCR 1325 
references is an encouraging sign and suggests that gender mainstreaming is 
becoming more normalized within the daily routines of the Security Council.”119 
The assumption of rhetorical political correctness is not a direct indication of 
transformed cultural and social values towards women.120 In the context of Lebanon, 
national rhetoric for gender focal points, including gender-based violence and gender 
mainstreaming was used in the prior 1997 National Strategy. Yet, and since, political 
participation and women’s rights have not been reflective of the rhetorical 
correctness. Partly, efforts to transform cultural stereotypes of women as victims to 
leaders in peace building and nation-state development require an ideological 
challenge against traditional gender stereotypes, requiring national legislation to 
support women in such roles.  
Under its institutional framework, the NCLW and women’s advocacy society 
agree to structurally prevent future causes of fragmentation in the movement with 
solutions of joint effort, partnership, and equal dissemination of reports and results 
amongst partnered groups. Yet, its revamped organizational structure does little to 
challenge the power dynamics favorable to an imperious political structure of 
sectarianism and patriarchy. In fact, the National Strategy accepts the notion of 
fragmentation as solely a product of disorganization amongst women’s groups, and 
that “Such partnership [between the NCLW, public administrations and institutions, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Black, 2009, p. 1 
120 Black, 2009!
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and civil society] also would bring added bargaining power and influence during the 
negotiation process with the concerned authorities.”121 Rather, the institutionalization 
of women’s advocacy groups under the governmental institution NCLW only reduces 
civil society to a cog in the political machine of business as usual, while the 
mainstream women’s movement stands to support the yoke of male authority.   
The example of the NCLW-UNFPA partnership, nonetheless, is a national 
attempt to create an inclusive system of women’s participation in politics. This top-
down reform has in some ways advanced the agenda of a few existing women’s 
organization. Namely, from the civic sector, KAFA has benefitted from this 
strengthening of the NCLW. KAFA’s service as a lobbying body is the primary link 
between Nasawiya, grassroots organizing and top-down reform. However, along this 
spectrum, a noticeable breakdown occurs at exactly the point when activism among 
civil society becomes enmeshed with activism alongside political parties, as KAFA 
has done. 
Most recently, on January 29, 2013, KAFA headed its annual campaign for 
sixteen days of activism with a coalition of activists under the heading, “The 
Protection of Women is more important than your seats.”122 This latest campaign is 
meant to shame Members of Parliament and House Speaker, Nabih Berri for 
overlooking KAFA’s draft law and the women’s movement’s dire call for a non-
confessional law to protect women against gender-based violence. This recent 
campaign culminated with a street protest on February 24, 2013. From Sanayeh 
Garden to Ain El-Tineh, Berri’s residential neighborhood, a march consisting of the 
National Coalition for Legalizing the Protection of Women from Family Violence. 
The make-up of this coalition is not outwardly described, however activists who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 NCLW, National Security Strategy 2011-2021, p. 29 
122 http://www.nasawiya.org/web/2013/02/!"#$-ء"&'("-)*+-')-),#&"-,/ 
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identify themselves as part of Nasawiya were present.123 Among the crowd were also 
political party representatives for the Free Patriotic Movement and the Al-Kata’eb Al 
Lubnanniyya, or the Lebanese Phalanges Party.124  
The 2013 protest for the Violence Against Women law was organized by 
KAFA. Its attempt was to be inclusive of all civil society actors. However, there was 
a noted backlash. In contrast to the 2012 protest organized by Nasawiya, the turn out 
was visibly smaller. Also visible was the disdain some protestors took to march 
alongside political party representatives. In a post mortem recap, an activist present at 
the 2013 protest poignantly wrote:  
“To me and several other participants at the march, the presence of representatives 
from political parties, just added insult to injury. These parties, who don’t exactly 
have a track record of supporting the legislation [The Law to Protect Women from 
Family Violence], turned the march into a platform for their usual hypocritical 
speeches, in a desperate bid to win some votes ahead of the upcoming parliamentary 
elections.”125 
 
Despite a women’s advocacy group’s independent status as non-confessional, when 
conjoined to work on a women’s rights campaign with elite, sectarian decision-
makers, or inclusive of political parties a backlash ensues against the women’s 
movement. Secondly, centralized power will ultimately remain in the hands of the 
upper echelon of government, while political parties and their sectarian strife, or fitna 
will inevitably eclipse non-confessional women’s advocacy groups and their 
campaigns. A nod to political parties was felt as injurious to some activists who are 
trying to challenge the very system that promotes patriarchy and sectarian cooptation 
of the women’s movement.  
Consolidation of the mainstream women’s movement and its alignment with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 This note is from personal observation and attendance of the protest. 
124 Representatives of some political parties were noticeable at this protest by their emblemized banners 
that read “Now, not tomorrow, is the time to create a civil law to protect women from family violence.”!!
125 Hatem, J. (26, February 2013). Marching for domestic violence legislation. This quote was retrieved 
from http://racing-thoughts.com/2013/02/26/marching-for-domestic-violence-legislation/ 
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the state has solidified a new layer of state political contention amongst secular 
feminists of the women’s movement. The attempt at institution building of the 
mainstream women’s movement has inevitably marginalized secularist non-state 
actors who have been active in the women’s movement and civil society since up to 
2007. The significance being that, yet again, the state has cracked a new schism 
between the mainstream women’s movement and the alternative women’s movement. 
This schism has buttressed the spur of a counter movement, I argue, as a transnational 
feminist in scope and organization. Since 2009, the collective of feminist activists at 
Nasawiya have been organizing campaigns, demonstrations, and protests on the 
streets in Lebanon for an alternative means to mobilize constituents for women’s 
rights. This movement comes at time when Lebanon’s known grassroots women’s 
advocacy groups have been coopted to join government-mandated institutions.  
 
5.3 – Sowing Social Manifestations for Feminist Discourse  
Nasawiya’s founding principles aim to sever what is described as the 
oppressive nature of NGOs and transnational networks that staggers against the giants 
of Lebanon’s unchanging elitist decision-making body. In its formative stage, 
Nasawiya has erected a feminist, women’s advocacy group that experiments with 
various means to organize for an alternative civil society. This alternative is sustained 
through three approaches unseen in Lebanon’s existing civil society: entrepreneurial 
feminism, feminist collectivity, and online feminism for feminist webspace. The most 
prominent facet to organizing activism within Nasawiya relies on its inherently 
grassroots structure where:  
“At Nasawiya, we do not have a traditional NGO structure of boards, staff, 
and volunteers. We are a member-driven collective where everyone is equal 
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and in support of each other’s activism. We believe that we are stronger 
together.”126 
 
Among other characteristics, the collective approach is one that sets Nasawiya apart 
from the prevailing “personalistic style” organizing around a single leader in 
prominent women’s advocacy groups.127 Further, this chapter argues, the collective 
approach assists in sustaining Nasawiya’s genuinely grassroots, bottom-up 
movement.  
The following sections investigate the transnational features of Nasawiya. The 
basic assumptions of the chapter posit Nasawiya as an alternative feminist social 
movement within Lebanon’s women’s movement for gender justice and equality. 
Thus, the study implies the transnational, top-down approach facilitated by the 
UNFPA-NCLW partnership has inadvertently fragmentized women’s organizing 
between an institutional movement and a grassroots movement. However, due to the 
transnational influences on Lebanon’s women’s movement, the countermovement 
will inevitably be a force of tranationalism, too. From this counter movement, a new 
transnational activism emerges for a new social and political movement towards 
women’s rights. Further, this chapter edifies the transnationality of Nasawiya as a 
movement within two spheres: a domestic coalition of feminist activists; and a social 
movement with transnational, regional and international networks.  Altogether, 
Nasawiya poses a case study of new transnational activism in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement. Before deconstructing Nasawiya as a transnational feminist and a national 
social movement in Lebanon, the following sections will briefly introduce Nasawiya 
as a collective based on the movement’s origin, objective, structure of organizing, and 
the current campaign initiatives enacted by independent activists of Nasawiya.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Nasawiya, Who are the Nasawiyas?, Retrieved from http://www.nasawiya.org/web/about-us/who-
are-the-nasawiyas/ 
127 Bray-Collins, 2003, p. 76 
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Nasawiya has evolved into a feminist movement for the reclamation of public 
spaces for feminist sensitization in a cultural setting overrun by male chauvinism. 
Since the movement’s origin, activism has focused on consciousness raising 
campaigns on feminism and workshops for transformative change at the most 
grassroots, community level. Founding feminist activists of Nasawiya originally 
began organizing for bodily rights and sexuality awareness with LGBTQI non-profit 
groups Meem and Helem and in association with transnational networks in the 
Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR). Since 2004, the 
transnational organization Helem128 has been prominently working to “[lead] a 
peaceful struggle for the liberation [and awareness] of non-conforming sexuality and 
gender identity in Lebanon.” Helem’s main activism is to revoke penal code 534, 
which upholds “unnatural sexual intercourse” as punishable by law. Helem’s 
organization was a breakthrough for grassroots activism by proving means to refute 
the weapon of social interpretations and state legislation that target non-conforming 
social behavior. Incepted in 2007, Meem has promoted “empowerment through self-
organizing” for the LBTQI community in Lebanon.129  
As a side note, Meem was spurred by a movement of activists who wanted to 
create a space for sexually non-conforming women to organize, while Helem 
proceeded to popularly become a transnational movement for sexually non-
conforming men. In retrospect, Meem’s offshoot from Helem within the LGBTQI 
community was a sign of fragmentation between differing perspectives on gender 
relations among activists themselves. In the midst of writing this chapter, former !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Despite Lebanon’s lack of recognition, Helem is a non-profit, non-governmental organization 
registered in Canada, France, and the United States with branches in Montreal, Paris, and San 
Francisco. (Helem, 21 October 2008, A case study of the first, legal, above-ground LGBT organization 
in the MENA region, Retrieved from http://helem.net/sites/default/files/WB-
HELEM_CaseStudy2009_0.pdf 
129 Meem. (27, August 2007). What is Meem?, Retrieved from http://meemgroup.org/news/what-is-
meem/ 
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members of Helem published blog posts in the form of testimonies. In a recent blog 
post from Nfasharte, a former member of Helem wrote: 
“I’d like to speak about my experience as a woman inside this organization and my 
relationship with its members and leaders. A strange feeling crept up on me as I got 
to know many members better, when I discovered that the way they greet women is 
not through a handshake, but through grabbing her breasts…This idea in particular, 
that women’s bodies are public and revolve around men’s sexuality and desire, forms 
the basis of the patriarchal system that discriminates against me as a woman and 
makes me pay very dearly for my non-normative personal choices…Among the other 
things that reproduce patriarchal structures among many members of Helem is the 
image they have of femininity, the same image in the mainstream social imagination: 
superficial, gossipy, catty, enemies with other women and obsessed with the world of 
fashion and beauty with the goal of attracting men. I have always fought against this 
in my personal life, and I’ve always had my own standards of beauty and my own 
non-normative version of femininity. Women who fall outside social norms of beauty 
and femininity are considered by the men of Helem to be “abnormal”, “angry 
lesbians”, “ugly”, “dirty” and “smelly”. …This general anti-woman atmosphere 
created the perfect breeding environment for sexual harassment. 
All of this verbal and physical harassment has bothered me and many other women in 
Helem. There was never any genuine attempt to solve the problem, and so many 
women ended up leaving the organization completely. The lack of serious 
engagement was always tied to a patriarchal structure within the organization that 
absolves those who discriminate and harass. This structure becomes clear in the 
reactions that inevitably follow any complaint: blaming the victim, relegating the 
problem to a just a few bad apples, and mocking the women, among other oppressive 
strategies designed to silence anyone who dares to speak out. I think today is finally 
the time for these violations against women’s bodies to stop. I am speaking out now 
so that this doesn’t happen again to other women in the future.”130 
From these narratives, a former member of Helem set out to prove the seed of gender-
based violence in Lebanon exists among varying demographics, and is even 
perpetuated between factions who identify themselves as subjects of discrimination. 
The pervasiveness of gender based violence and sexual harassment is attributed to 
“outside factors” that have shaped the “mechanism” of Helem’s organizational 
structure.131 Three components of social behavior are described to have caused a 
schism over gender-based violence between men and women in the LGBTQI 
community: character assassination, shaming and silencing, and reluctance of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 Nfarsharte. (2012, September 10). Helem and the weapons of patriarchy [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://nfasharte.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/helem-and-the-weapons-of-patriarchy/ 
131 Nfarsharte. (2012, September 10). Helem and the weapons of patriarchy [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://nfasharte.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/helem-and-the-weapons-of-patriarchy/ 
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accountability: 
“As with all previous instances of organization-splitting arguments, the immediate 
reaction by most of those involved was to sweep it all under a carpet and pretend it 
never happened. This was done, first of all, by framing it as a ‘personal argument’ 
that, apparently, does not reflect negatively on the politics of the organization as a 
whole. Secondly, there was shameless pride from some of the members and key 
people in the organization and community in having ‘defeated’ the ‘evil terrorists’ by 
shaming them into leaving. Thirdly, after this event and during Helem’s general 
assembly, the same members who participated in sexist slander suddenly started 
speaking about ‘women’s rights’ and about how making a ‘safe space for women 
should become a priority for Helem. Those same people refused to acknowledge any 
wrongdoing or apologize for their hurtful and misogynist remarks and actions, and 
continued to slander women who spoke up not just in Lebanon, but regionally. While 
they might think that saying tokenistic phrases about women’s rights may shield them 
from criticism, it is their actual actions that count and that show otherwise.”132 
 
The case of Helem can be seen as a “microcosm of gender-based violence” in 
Lebanon. Former members who have come forth with testimonies have emphasized 
that the objective to their narratives is not to slander the organization as a whole, but 
rather to contextualize the extent of patriarchal organizing, misogyny, the inherent 
‘male-privilege’ in institutions, and the pitfalls of NGO tactics in Lebanon’s civil 
society. For this study, the relevance of these incidents provides further details of the 
impetuous for grassroots activists in Lebanon to build a feminist movement.  
The “outside factors” affecting social movement organizing are referent to 
social norms in Lebanon that which enable sexual harassment and gender-based 
violence to occur in the first place. While there is reportedly “an undeniable trend of 
gender based discrimination that has thus far gone unaddressed” within the grassroots 
community, a recent campaign to address sexual harassment has emerged within the 
feminist community to employ transformative justice and build a culture of 
accountability. While nobody is immune to social conformity, as long as there are 
members within the community (whether they have been offended or were affected 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Nfarsharte. (2012, September 10). Helem and the weapons of patriarchy [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://nfasharte.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/helem-and-the-weapons-of-patriarchy/ 
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by sexual harassment) who refuse to speak up and be part of the change, a schism in 
social movement organizing around the issue of women’s rights will persist and 
eventually deaden the grassroots community’s efforts for a women’s movement. 
When looking at activism through Helem and Meem from a distance, and 
unknowing of the fragmentation between the LGBTQI community, the movements 
are notable for bringing forth discursive interpretations of human rights in Lebanon. 
From this earlier established grassroots community, a confluence of activists would 
come together to found a transnational feminist movement to not only campaign for 
women’s rights, but also within a critical context of sectarianism, patriarchy, and 
globalization.  
However, there are inveterate structures of grassroots organizing in Lebanon 
that I argue have led a grassroots community from one of loosely connected networks 
into culmination of a social and political movement under Nasawiya. The LGBTQI 
movement initiated non-conformist campaigns for additional action plans to 
challenge, on the broadest level, Lebanon’s constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement of universal human rights by the ruling elite, religious clerics, and 
pervasive social and cultural taboos. Further, their organizational structures for 
inclusivity, grassroots self-organizing, and horizontal, transnational activism would 
become fixtures in the emergent feminist movement. Particularly, founding activists 
of the grassroots feminist movement would continue to contest the prevailing power 
structures of the state and consequently further international contention. 
Although the grassroots community of activists had been organizing for years 
before, the origins of Nasawiya date to 2007. To commemorate International 
Women’s Day, on March 10 activists hosted an event that would be “The first of its 
kind in being organized by young women and also being able to bring together 
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different women figures and groups together [in Lebanon].”133  
The intent to organize for International Women’s Day 2007 was described as 
follows:  
“[We] Invite you to attend, participate and celebrate with us in an event sparking a 
new initiative within the cultural and social realm of Beirut: “Women's Day”. An 
initiative that aims to bring women and women friendly people together so that they 
may jointly think and explore tools of work having a direct impact in women's lives. 
Our aim is to celebrate with all of you who have worked, struggled, fought, felt 
mistreated and marginalized to come together for a second round, with an uprising 
generation of young women and men determined to bring equality within their 
present.”134 
“This event will be a scheme where culture and social initiative will be to create and 
thus building a concrete network working on women and tackling women issues from 
a different perspective. This space will be mixed between employee women, 
journalists, politicians, and artists. We will be together to share their experiences and 
to fix a program to continue their demands on the political, economical [sic], and 
personal level.”135 
“The occasion marks the beginning of a long-term collaborative endeavor that aims to 
create a network of active organizations and individuals determined to realize gender 
equality in a collective present.”136 
 
These promotional descriptions of IWD 2007 in Lebanon describe a grievance among 
young activists for a renewed women’s movement. Simultaneously, the means to 
organize coincided with the juncture of international interest to fund human rights 
campaigns in the region. But most interesting, the effort to organize was on behalf of 
activists in Lebanon who recognized a disjuncture between the state of the women’s 
movement in principle and praxis.  
In 2008, along with the momentum of KAFA’s campaign against gender-
based violence, Banat Akhir Zaman simultaneously emerged with aspirations to 
become a proactive grassroots feminist campaign for bodily rights. Over the previous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 S. A. G., personal communication, August 29, 2012 
134 Taharar!, International Women’s Day, Retrieved from 
http://www.taharar.org/International%20Women%27s%20Day 
135 This description was taken from the event’s promotional poster, Retrieved from 
http://urshalim.blogspot.com/2007/03/international-womens-day-lebanon.html 
136 Attac Libnan, International Women’s Day in Beirut, 05 March 2007, Retrieved from 
http://www.liban.attac.org/).#-!+-)("-#)("/(" 
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year, feminist activists began reclaiming web spaces on online to nashr, or publish 
feminist critiques of the state of women in Lebanon. From a blog post by campaign 
members in Banat Akhir Zaman, the feminist campaign was fueled by the social 
construction that women in Lebanon are as liberated as their bodies are portrayed 
through media: 
“When one attempts at discussing the status of women in Lebanon these days 
and comparing it with that of women in the Arab world, challengers ignorantly bring 
about the stereotypes of the women at the forefront of Lebanese media as examples to 
back their invalid arguments…outsiders believe that the typical seemingly liberated 
bodies that are circulated around all the music channels actually do represent the 
whole of the situation of Lebanese women. Wrong.”137 
 
In this blog post, a feminist activist of Banat Akhir Zaman made an implicit contrast 
between the media’s broadcasted image of women and the reality of formless, 
nonexistent personal status laws for women’s liberties. This contrast is even more 
evocative in the context of the region’s sweeping reforms in personal status laws 
within other MENA nations. Yet, with only hollow victories for women’s rights, 
women in Lebanon are unjustly mistaken as “liberated bodies”. The outspoken blog 
post is an earlier example of feminist discourse becoming relevant as social cleavages 
begin to reveal grievances from globalization, internationalization, and patriarchy in 
the public, private and, I argue, the international spheres. 
Following the momentum of the mainstream women’s movement, and 
particularly in KAFA’s campaigns, the ‘alternative’, feminist women’s movement 
gained traction as a grassroots effort. In January 2009, campaign members of Banat 
Akhir Zaman banded with independent activists for a Feminist Collective to create a 
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137 Salka, F. (2008, March 7). Sexism in the cedar land. Retrieved from 
http://banatakhirzaman.wordpress.com/2008/03/07/sexism-in-the-cedar-land-by-farah-salka/. 
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“platform to allow different feminists to work on different groups in one office.”138 
By International Women’s Day on March 8, 2009, the campaign for Banat Akhir 
Zaman coalesced into a formative collective of activists among Lebanon’s feminists 
for a social movement and “the first group of its kind in Lebanon.”139 Known as 
Beirut’s Feminist Collective, the movement organized its first demonstration to 
commemorate the universal day to protest the status of women in Lebanon. 
International Women’s Day 2009 occurred in the midst of contention for electoral 
reform and just before national elections. By this year, CRTD-A had already launched 
the campaign “My nationality, my right for me any family,”140 KAFA had initiated a 
campaign on violence against women (VAW), and yet, the grassroots movement had 
still been unable to perforate the bulwark of politics-as-usual and prove women’s 
issues deserve more than scant attention.  
IWD 2009 would be the beginning of an annual tradition for feminist activists 
from Nasawiya to take the streets and engage people of Lebanon in grassroots 
activism. Dubbed as Hello Women in 2012, the campaign for International Women’s 
Day follows very basic structures of organizing seen throughout women’s movements 
across the world. Along with an evening protest to “Take Back the Night” and 
“reclaim the streets from harassment women face,” every year, the feminist activists 
disperse in groups throughout Lebanon to gather societal perspectives from women on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Before Feminist Collective emerged as a comprehensive social and political movement, members of 
the collective originated as independent activists from Beirut-based IndyACT, (Saade, R., 
Camperspeak: sectarianism can be a challenge to info-activism, Retrieved from 
http://infoactivismcamp.tacticaltech.org/node/55). 
139 Goodman, J. (2009, March 06). Feminist Collective takes aim at male-centered politics. The Daily 
Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/Mar/06/Feminist-Collective-
takes-aim-at-male-centered-politics.ashx#axzz25IdAYpPV 
140 On the eve of the Israeli-Hezbollah July War, in 2006, CRTD-A and independent activists worked 
alongside MP Ghinwa Jalloul to pressure Lebanese Parliament to pass Jalloul’s draft law on women 
and citizenship rights, which would allow women to pass on their citizenship to their respective 
children, and benefit from equal citizenship rights as men. Jalloul said pressing security concerns and 
Parliament's National Dialogue make it difficult to give the issue the attention it deserves (Lutz, M. 
(09, March 2006). Women’s Day underscores citizenship rights proposal. The Daily Star. Retrieved 
from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/Mar/09/Womens-Day-underscores-citizenship-
rights-proposal.ashx#axzz25IdAYpPV).  
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1) challenges they face as women and 2) what changes would they like to see made in 
Lebanon in regards to the social and political status of women. According to members 
of the collective, the objective of this demonstration is: 
  1. For us, as feminists, to listen, grow and learn from what women have to say. 
2. To let the women we meet express themselves, think about the questions, voice 
their  
   opinions, concerns, and stories. 
3. To let women know that our collective is out there and is supporting them and that 
they  
   are welcome to join us and work with us.141 
Implicit in their objectives, IWD is an opportunity for the collective to generate 
nashrah, or produce and publish independent reports on women’s opinions of their 
status as citizens in Lebanon. Usage of social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, blogs, and web spaces supply the means then to broadcast their data on 
social perspectives on women’s status in Lebanon. Nashrah is then an extension of 
nashaat, or activism, to generate alternative responses of women’s social attitudes. 
The content produced in this approach is an attempted rebuttal to the widespread 
portrayal of Lebanese women in mainstream media (MSM) as ‘liberated bodies’.  
International Women’s Day in Lebanon has become a popular occasion 
amongst women’s advocacy groups. Although IWD is not a formal or mandated 
national day in Lebanon, commemoration among women’s advocacy groups has 
become informally institutionalized at university campuses, through the NCLW and 
in civil society, and across media outlets. Yet, the means and presentation of IWD 
celebrations in Lebanon are varied across the women’s movement, and more broadly 
across the community of women’s advocacy groups. From a distance, the attention 
IWD has received in Lebanon since 1998 shows that women seem to be celebrated 
and met with sincere acclamation each year. However, there is a clear discrepancy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Hatem, J. (4, March 2011). #HelloWomen: We wanna to talk to you. Retrieved from 
http://www.nasawiya.org/web/2011/03/hellowomen-we-wanna-talk-to-you/ 
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between how IWD is commemorated between women’s advocacy groups. For 
Nasawiya, IWD serves as an opportunity to protest grievances and demand urgency 
from decision makers to recognize the plight of women in Lebanon. This is in stark 
contrast to how other women’s organizations or advocacy groups have utilized IWD 
as a day to promote superficial or hallow advancements for women in Lebanon.   
The overt distinction between the ways IWD is commemorated in Lebanon is 
either an opportunity to protest for change, as seen by Nasawiya’s movement, or a 
day of celebrating achievements made by women in Lebanon. While both reasons to 
commemorate IWD are respectively controversial, they are also representative of two 
prevailing differences in the women’s movement as a whole: 1) discourse and 2) 
organizational structure. For example, at IWD in 2009, two contrasting 
commemorations took place in Beirut: one organized by IWSAW and the other by a 
group of feminist activists who referred to themselves as the Feminist Collective (and 
before officiating their movement under the name Nasawiya). From a comparative 
perspective of the means and presentation of IWD celebrations between a women’s 
advocacy group and a grassroots feminists collective, a feminist activist’s perspective 
will ultimately provide a reflection between these divergent discourses in Lebanon’s 
contemporary women’s movement: 
 “IWSAW [celebrated] women’s day by paying tribute to the women soldiers in the 
Lebanese Army. On the one hand, I understand that the army is sometimes the only 
‘respectable’ place for many working class young people, mainly from rural areas, to 
turn to, but at the same time, why must we honor an institution that is built on 
machismo and violence—that is a basic facet of the nationalistic patriarchal world we 
live in. While I always respect individual women who are getting themselves into 
male-dominated spaces, I think, as far as women’s rights groups go at least, we could 
focus our efforts more on creating a world free from militarism instead, even if 
people call us crazy and utopian now; I think it’ll be worth it on the long run.”142 
 
The Institute of Women’s Studies in the Arab World (IWSAW) has been 
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142 D. (2009, April 03). Residues of March. Feminist Collective: International Women’s Day. Retrieved 
from http://feministcollective.blogspot.com/search/label/International%20Women%27s%20Day 
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commemorating IWD in Lebanon since 1998. Since its inception in 1973, IWSAW 
has been notable for publishing research on women’s studies and for being an 
influential resource for women’s advocacy groups in the region, and especially for its 
feminist journal al-Raida. Although the Institute is prohibited143 from directly 
participating in demonstrations, protests, or campaigns, its description by a member 
of the Feminist Collective holds a specific truth about women’s organizing. From the 
perception of a feminist activist, IWSAW is ostensibly a neutral beacon in the 
women’s movement in  that it publishes a feminist journal yet supports women’s 
collusion with ‘patriarchal’ institutions. Regardless of these subjective views, this 
protest against supporting ‘machismo’ and nationalistic patriarchy is a further 
indication of a new feminist radical discourse among activists. Ultimately the 
differing celebrations of IWD provide examples of divided discourse for women’s 
rights through the prism of a women’s movement and a feminist movement. 
Secondly, taken from the perspective of the feminist movement, women in 
Lebanon have not succeeded collectively. Lebanese women have undoubtedly 
succeeded and contributed to society, however in individual endeavors. For example, 
in activism, the late Laure Moghaizel is upheld as a renowned figure of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement. Moghaizel’s contributions include the creation of the 
Democratic Party of Lebanon, the Lebanese Association for Human Rights, and 
Bahithat, an institute for Lebanese women researchers. Moghaizel’s activism along 
with her husband is cited as instrumental in bringing the Lebanese state to sign and 
ratify UN convention CEDAW.144 In civil society, and as argued by Bray-Collins 
(2003) and Khattab (2010), associational leaders of women’s advocacy groups have 
been recognized at the forefront of the women’s movement. At the institutional and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 From an interview with former director of IWSAW, Dr. Mona Khalaf, Bray-Collins (2003) clarifies 
that according to LAU protocol, the Institute is a source for research and not demonstrations. 
144 Stephen, 2010 
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academic level, the Institute of Women’s Studies in the Arab World (IWSAW) at 
Lebanese American University, my own stomping grounds, even maintains a database 
of “prominent contemporary” Lebanese women. This online database is meant to 
reflect “As representative as possible of Lebanese women’s achievements...At the 
same time, the list will be duly selective to reflect a high level of achievement by 
every woman included, depending on her field.”145 The critique is not against 
institutions and individual achievements, but rather against the complacency within 
these institutions and communities that either commemorate women’s individual 
achievements, or women’s collusion with ‘male-dominated spheres’. Often, 
individual achievements are mistaken as indication of women’s overall, collective 
progress in Lebanon. Thus, when feminist activists voluntarily protest for social and 
political change on IWD, their collective point is to further produce an alternative 
discourse for a collective movement for achievements for women in Lebanon. 
Tarrow (2005) would argue, because of its international appeal, IWD serves as 
a “global frame” and incentive for women’s advocacy groups to organize campaigns 
through means of externalizing contention: 
Global framing describes only the domestic diffusion of a message in global terms 
and ignores the contacts and conflicts between its receivers and their opponents. But 
even in the absence of such contacts, imported symbols can make a difference to both 
elite and popular response.146 
Funding is often appropriated to women’s advocacy groups just for the 
occasion of International Women’s Day. For a women’s advocacy group, a 
commemoration framed around the themes of IWD can be used to externalize a claim 
for funding or to garner transnational support. In 2012, the NCLW, which boasts 
membership of politicians’ wives, celebrated UNIFIL women peacekeepers and their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World [IWSAW], Who is she in Lebanon?, Retrieved 
from http://whoisshe.lau.edu.lb/content/about-who-she-lebanon 
146 Tarrow, 2005, p. 64 
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role in “the National Campaign to Support Women in Decision-Making and Peace-
Building Positions.” Thus, the context of International Women’s Day is in itself a 
global frame, and as Tarrow states, the contacts and conflicts that emerge as a result 
of importing its symbol is contingent upon domestic factors. A feminist activist from 
Nasawiya describes the juncture between feminism and IWD, where: 
“Feminism however, in its ideal practices, seeks not to impose frames or values, but 
to keep alternative, empowering and contesting norms in circulation. A good example 
would be International Women’s Day (IWD), which, while centered around women 
and advocating for a global day of action, is still flexible enough to contain the 
particularities of any woman’s struggle.”147 
 
The emphasis being that International Women’s Day has seen participation of the 
grassroots movement multiply. Yet, for its ‘flexibility,’ IWD will remain as a day of 
protest for the women’s movement, and will continue to reflect varied strategies for 
furthering women’s movements in Lebanon. For grassroots women’s organizations 
such as the Feminist Collective, IWD is markedly a day that can promote visibility for 
its cause.   
 As of 2012, Beirut’s Feminist Collective became known as Nasawiya 
(feminism). Since its inception in 2010, Nasawiya has grown in membership and in 
the number of campaign it engages in. The feminist collective consists of 270 
independent activists, and though it began with one campaign for gender-awareness 
training in 2010, members now work across ten various initiatives produced in or 
around Nasawiya. The collective, however, did not emerge without tribulations. 
Moawad describes the movement to have begun with Banat Akhir Zaman as “a first 
attempt at young feminist organizing. [However,] it did not follow through and died 
out, then became The Feminist Collective and then that became Nasawiya, the final !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 Dariwch, L., & Maikey, H. (2011, October 12). From the belly of queer activism: Challenges and 
opportunities. Bekhsoos. Retrieved from http://www.bekhsoos.com/web/2011/10/from-the-belly-of-
arab-queer-activism-challenges-and-opportunities/ 
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functioning version.”148 
Although its origin in Beirut remains a perennial feature, some campaigns in 
Nasawiya stride across the MENA region and in solidarity with other Arab feminist 
movements for gender justice and equality. Further, Nasawiya serves as a 
headquarters for expansive global networks in campaigns such as the Coalition for 
Sexual Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR). Along with its expansion of 
membership, the collective has taken on the role as an umbrella of support for any 
feminist campaign in Lebanon. Thus, members of Nasawiya provide ancillary 
grassroots activism for both international campaigns and national campaigns for the 
women’s movement. The collective’s work is not tethered to any single partnerships, 
institution, or organization, but rather serves as an alternative hub for churning social 
and political issues into opportunities for organizing grassroots activities and services. 
As a transnational movement from below, Nasawiya activists work horizontally to 
organize grassroots campaigns, demonstrations, and protests with national civil 
society institutions, namely KAFA and CRTD-A.   
 In presenting the case study of Nasawiya, this chapter challenges the 
purported arguments of feminism as an imported ideology or production of the 
‘West’. While feminist activism has existed throughout Lebanon’s history, its 
ideological paradigm has been tethered to the works of individual elites, whether 
independent or as associational leaders of women’s advocacy groups. Nasawiya’s 
organizing structure is unprecedented in that it seeks to conjoin existing groups with 
individual activists to mobilize for social change. This is in contrast to institutional 
organizing of civil society, as in the case of the UNFPA-NCLW partnership in 
Lebanon. Without a grassroots social movement in Lebanon, women’s legal status 
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will only progress either through individual accomplishments in increments over time 
or in alignment with the ruling cartel. The individual approach to social change has 
proven to fragment the women’s movement, just as a vertical alignment with the state 
has allowed elite decision-makers to distort and co-opt women’s rights campaigns for 
the benefit of sustaining a status quo political system.  
Further, the scope of feminism as an underlying framework for campaign 
initiatives in not a foreign ideology to women and activists in Lebanon. Through the 
diffusion of transnational feminist organizing, however, feminism in Lebanon has 
gained esteem since the reemergence of the women’s movement post-1975-1990 war. 
The trickle of organized initiatives from the international community has enabled 
internationalization of women’s rights to permeate the women’s movement in 
Lebanon through institution building and in building a bottom-up social movement. 
The top-down approach has taken a significant stronghold over the women’s 
movement, however the bottom-up, grassroots approach is beginning to take on a 
prominent role.  
 
5.4 – Patriarchal Politics and Power Dynamics: The Political is 
Personal 
Part of what makes Nasawiya as a unique collective of activists among 
Lebanon’s women’s advocacy groups is the movement’s outspoken framing of 
resistance against hegemony of the state and international order. As delineated in 
Chapter Four, this thesis argues that the reordering of the women’s advocacy 
community under a mandated UNFPA-NCLW partnership has only served as a 
cosmetic improvement of the women’s movement fragmented structure, despite the 
multi-year and million-dollar UNFPA sponsorship. The NCLW’s inherent alignment 
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with the state, with the first ladies of the sectarian government, (wives of the 
president, prime minister, and speaker of the house) as associational leaders, clearly 
depicts the limitations of the mainstream women’s movement. Strategies of 
“patriarchal bargain,” “ethnic bargain” and “liberal bargain,”149 within the mainstream 
women’s movement risks committing offense towards a “triple marginalization” 
against women in Lebanon along ethno-national, class-based, and gendered lines.150  
According to Kandiyoti (1988), Cockburn (2004), and Sa’ar (2005) 
respectively, such ‘bargains’ illustrate the limitations of women’s agency in power 
structures. Within the civic space of women’s organizing, the case of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement is fragmentized between a mainstream movement and a feminist 
movement, where the former movement marginalizes the latter on the basis of 
foregoing a unified movement in the face of such bargains. 
 While the women’s movement altogether advances goals for women’s 
liberation from gendered violence, women’s empowerment, and inclusion in political 
participation, the UNFPA-NCLW partnership can be seen as a quintessential liberal 
bargain that marginalizes any women’s organizing that refuses to adopt the ethnic and 
patriarchal structural status quo. Thus, seeking a liberal bargain, or the acceptance of 
“whiteness” and “maleness” by internalizing and externalizing contention through the 
UNFPA, the women’s movement directly serves as an incubator of international and 
state contention vis-à-vis the feminist movement. In the vein of ‘going native’ to 
assimilate to indigenous culture, “going white” is an argument amongst postcolonial 
feminist theory to explain how “members of disempowered backgrounds have 
adopted its [the liberal model] modes of thinking and knowing…[and], through access 
to right cultural capital, are in position to share the liberal dividend,” and whiteness !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Kandiyoti, 1988; Cockburn, 2004; Sa’ar, 2005 
150 Sa’ar, 2005 
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and maleness “assume a formidable and unchanging character because they are 
anchored in robust regimes of power.”151 At the cost of a unified and women’s 
movement, the liberal bargain between the NCLW-UNFPA on one hand serves the 
privilege of women involved. Simultaneously, the liberal bargain is a kowtow to the 
sectarian and patriarchal system in Lebanon. As Sa’ar describes, the liberal bargain in 
Third World countries “reduces the power of these identity components to shape a 
critical consciousness.”152 For women who kowtow to the liberal bargain through 
their reinforcement of a top-down movement and the adoption of UN rhetoric for 
‘political correctness’ in the National Strategy platform, their admissions as leaders of 
the women’s movement poses a bleak future for women’s rights.  
This following section will describe the goals of Nasawiya’s feminist 
movement to elaborate on activists’ efforts to raise consciousness among women and 
refute such strategies adopted by the mainstream women’s movement.  
The collective’s objectives are intimately intertwined within the declaration of 
their qiyamouna, or value system, wherein:  
• Sexism, which is a devastating result of the feudal/patriarchal culture that we 
live in, is a major social problem that we should work to eradicate, especially 
since it is deeply related to other social problems, such as classism, 
heterosexism, capitalism, racism, sectarianism, etc. Therefore, we must fight 
all forms of violence, discrimination, and exploitation that are based on gender, 
sexuality, able-bodied, ethnicity, race, religion, class, etc. 
• As women, we have the right to a positive self-image and an emotionally, 
mentally, and physically healthy life. 
• As women, we have the right to our bodies and our sexualities. In other words, 
women should be free to express their sexuality, free to make a choice about 
engaging or not engaging in sexual acts and/or relationships, free to choose 
whether they want to marry or not, whether they want to undergo an abortion 
or not. Women must also have easier access to helpful and non-judgmental 
sexual health services, as well as sexual education. 
• We must work to eliminate all forms of harassment, and all forms of gender-
based violence, verbal, physical, and sexual, wherever they happen. 
• All women should have equal rights of employment, and equal treatment and 
pay in the workplace. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Sa’ar, 2005, p. 688 
152 Sa’ar, 2005, p.689 
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• Women should be encouraged to enter the fields of study and work that are 
currently dominated by men, such as sciences, sports, etc. 
• Domestic migrant workers are employees and should have all the rights of 
employment, starting with respect and equality. 
• We have a responsibility to be smart consumers since what we buy and where 
we buy from are political as well as personal choices that affect us all. 
• We should encourage women to start women-friendly, workers-friendly and 
environmentally friendly small businesses. Women must play an active role in 
the political process, and lead the way in political reform. 
• Women must have all their citizenship rights. 
• Women must assume more leadership roles, in the private and public spheres, 
to reflect their central role in their communities. 
• We have to promote feminist art, women-friendly media, and women’s studies 
courses and institutes. 
• We should respect our natural environment, as exploitation of nature is parallel 
to the exploitation of women. 
• We should support other feminists in the Arab world, the global south, and the 
rest of the world, who are working towards a similar vision of a better world.153 
 
The value system of Nasawiya presents the core of all campaign initiatives, and the 
changes activists wish to realize and diffuse throughout the cultural practice of human 
and women’s rights in Lebanon. At the objective level, the collective implicitly 
differentiates itself from its fellow women’s advocacy groups. Its emphasis on ‘We’ 
as the vehicle for social change is the founding principle for transformative gender 
justice and equality. This approach is rooted in social education for awareness of 
social and political norms in Lebanon. In promoting awareness, Nasawiya’s 
campaigns also call for community accountability in lieu of legal frameworks for 
government accountability, and currently in cases such as sexual harassment. In a 
general sense, community accountability requires the commitment of activists and 
community members to realize their shared grievances, with a priority for:  
“This change in ourselves and in our communities is first and foremost one of 
healing, of openly talking about the multiple sources of our pain—our personal and 
collective histories, in non-judgmental, women-friendly environments, and then 
working together to eliminate these problems.” 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 Nasawiya: A feminist collective, Our Values, Retrieved from http://www.nasawiya.org/web/about-
us/our-values/ 
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In promoting a culture of community accountability, Nasawiya’s objective is to 
expose the nuances in Lebanon’s social and political culture that which enable 
oppression against all women and men. The value system of feminism thus serves as a 
foundation for a critical framework in activism. In the context of Lebanon, this 
movement begins at the most rudimentary level of social oppression to address 
pervasive cultural taboos, or topics considered shameful or aieyb. In an interview with 
a national newspaper, Nadine Moawad explains how a feminist movement could elicit 
women to challenge various socials taboo surrounding the issue of women’s lack of 
‘empowerment’: 
“In addition to the political sphere, society is also a front in the struggle for gender 
justice in Lebanon…Lebanese women are inundated with expectations of the female 
body that adhere to certain beauty norms: blonde, straight hair; small, neat noses; 
large lips and flat stomachs. Under the weight of tremendous social pressure to 
conform to gender stereotypes, women suffer huge damage to their self-esteem. This 
is exacerbated…by the complete lack of discussion around these issues…[To re-
engage debates on women’s issues in Lebanon] this can be achieved…by spreading 
awareness and promoting debate about sexual health, sexual education in schools and 
sexual harassment. Through opening up a dialogue around these focal issues 
[Nasawiya] hopes to encourage women to be more aware of the various forces at play 
in determining gender norms and expectations. In turn…such a dialogue will enable 
women to explore different ways in which they can reassert their agency in order to 
bring about positive change in their lives…On the other hand…the problem of 
political disempowerment among women in Lebanon [continues. Yet] along with the 
empowerment of women in politics per se, the mainstreaming of core feminist values 
such as equality, solidarity and critical engagement with multi-faceted mechanisms of 
oppression is the key to breaking away from the endless cycles of sectarian 
squabbling that continue to mire Lebanese society.”154 
 
Along with civil society groups, KAFA, Helem, and Himaya, Nasawiya 
provides a support helpline on behalf of Salwa, a campaign against sexual 
harassment. An activist from the collective emphasized a discrepancy between 
campaigning for rights as a civil society actor and Nasawiya’s objective to uphold 
feminism as an alternative discourse for implementing women’s rights in Lebanon:   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Goodman, 2009 
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“[‘Women’s rights’] are more of a checklist, like participation in politics, work, 
education, etcetera. When you get those rights you check it off and think, ‘finished,’ 
… [Nasawiya’s objectives are] much deeper than getting the law right, [but rather] 
thinking about how to make society actually adapt and accept [women’s rights].155 
 
Most interesting, Nasawiya’s objectives do not categorically align with any single or 
specific kind of feminism. Rather, the movement aims to redefine the women’s 
movement from a “docile” one in terms of organizational structure and towards one 
for a collective consciousness to challenge pervasive social and cultural norms of 
violence against women. 
Per its organizational structure, anyone is welcomed to join Nasawiya as long 
as they are self-identified feminist activists156 and uphold the collective’s qiyamouna, 
or value system. The structure of collectivity does not rest upon a formal 
organizational approach, but is driven by a loose, network-like structure. Castells 
(2000) proposed for a new sociological conception of a network society, an evolved 
form of social organizing, wherein: 
“A social structure made up of networks is an interactive system, constantly on the 
move. Social actors constituted as networks add and subtract components, which 
bring them into the acting network new values and interests defined in terms of their 
matrix in changing social structure. Structure makes practices, and practices enact 
and change structures following the same networking logic and dealing in similar 
terms with the programming and reprogramming of networks’ goals, by setting up 
these goals on the basis of cultural codes.”157 
 
This theory of the network society theorizes mobilization of resources for a 
transnational movement. Most important, it provides an argument against reductionist 
claims of social structures to exist within confines of “the mechanical view” of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Taylor, A. (2011, January 16). Nasawiya: Decontaminating ‘feminism’. Albawaba. Retrieved from 
http://www.albawaba.com/nasawiya-decontaminating-feminism 
156 “By activists, we mean individuals actively involved in gender justice work. Some Nasawiyas work 
full-time in women’s rights; others volunteer a few hours a month. Some are students and some are 
professionals in different fields. All of us are activists in different capacities, whether by leading our 
own feminist projects or by discussing gender with our friends and communities. In our jobs, classes, 
homes, and daily lives, we advocate for equality and social change” (Who are Nasawiyas? Retrieved 
from http://www.nasawiya.org/web/about-us/who-are-the-nasawiyas/).!
157 Castells, 2000, p. 697 
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institutions and organizations.158 In the network society, deepened interactions among 
society will bare a process of evolvement and generate “agencies of social change.”159 
Castell argues that the network society is more likely to initiate social change from 
attempts at trial and error of applying theory to practice.  
Nasawiya’s network-like structure is a purposeful step in the collective’s 
evolution from being a group of individual activists to realizing a social movement. 
To maintain a network-like structure is simultaneously an outward rejection of the 
rigidity in institutions and organizations that have dominated the scene of Lebanon’s 
women’s movement, and particularly of the inherent character of hegemonic ordering 
between organizers and associational leaders. In response to ongoing contention, and 
as the movement grows, attracts more activist members, and expands themes of 
initiatives to include multi-causes, the praxis of feminism becomes more distinct and 
the collective becomes more movement-like. In becoming agents of social change 
within the movement, the process of evolvement for activist presents its own set of 
contention most noticeably at attempts to reconcile between individualistic models of 
activism versus a collective approach. Yet, the collective maintains its cohesive 
movement through volunteerism and self-initiated campaigns or ‘initiatives’. As one 
member describes the collective, “There is no hierarchy. We have one coordinator for 
every initiative. Everyone has the right to start up a new initiative, as long as it has a 
strong feminist perspective and corresponds to our core values.”160  
Members often contribute activism towards more than one social issue. 
Abandoning any formal structural organizing is an exercise to sustaining a communal 
movement based on inclusivity and will. Where, “At Nasawiya, we do not have a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Castells, 2000, p. 697 
159 Castells, 2000, p. 697 
160 Sidiroupoulo, M. (2012, April 18). Nasawiya: Feminists made in Lebanon. Retrieved from 
http://deltawomen.blogspot.com/2012/04/nasawiya-feminists-made-in-lebanon.html 
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traditional NGO structure of boards, staff, and volunteers. We are a member-driven 
collective where everyone is equal and in support of each other’s activism. We 
believe that we are stronger together.”161 It is not atypical to find activists in 
Nasawiya who were once part of formal non-governmental organizations and 
women’s advocacy groups. As argued in Chapter Four, the inception of a feminist 
collective emerged as a response to the failure of formal organizing to mobilize 
constituents in the women’s movement. Rather, the collective was born out of an 
opportunity structure for a grassroots movement that would counter the highly 
politicized, cutthroat, competitive sphere of civil society, and rather provide for 
specifically mobilizing young feminist activists.  
An activist of Nasawiya, and a previous member of a well-known formal 
women’s advocacy group describes the contrast between activism and NGO work in 
women’s advocacy groups:  
“My own observations as an activist and a former NGO worker made me reach the 
conclusion that informal organizations, that are less professionalized, are more 
flexible and can adapt more easily. Networks and collectives also leave the door open 
for creative, dynamic initiatives that will be sustained by the commitment of the 
activists rather than by grants. Nasawiya is a loose organization within the women’s 
movement that had made the conscious choice to avoid ‘NGOization’ and 
professionalization in order to allow the maximum of independence to its members 
within their initiative, thus enabling a wider independence for the organization as a 
whole. Talking with other Lebanese activists, it has become very clear that many of 
them working in more professionalized structures struggle with the issue of 
resources: they loathe the competition donor funding creates between organizations 
(who they would tend to see as natural partners in ideology but who become rivals 
when it comes to access to resources), they have issues with the agenda-bending that 
donor trends entail, often estimate the system of donor funding unsustainable and 
almost all of them draw a line to what kind of funding they’re ready to accept.”162 
 
Nasawiya reemerged from an unsuccessful campaign for bodily rights and sexuality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Nasawiya, Who are Nasawiyas? Retrieved from http://www.nasawiya.org/web/about-us/who-are-
the-nasawiyas/ 
162 Daher, P. (2011, September 27). On NGOs versus activism: The impact of structure and donor 
trends. Café Thawra. Retrieved from http://cafethawrarevolution.wordpress.com/2011/09/27/on-ngos-
vs-activism-the-impact-of-structure-and-donor-trends/ 
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awareness to eventually flourish into a burgeoning feminist movement distinctly 
when the women’s movement needed a renewed impetus for change. Initially, the 
collective’s expansion came with an influx of young activists seeking to join a 
movement with a consistent outward focus on progressive change. The collective 
structure of Nasawiya seems to appeal to young activists who have experience in 
working under the restrictions of organized, professionalized, and institutionalized 
work in Lebanon’s women’s advocacy groups. Part of this impression is directly 
related to the friction and rigidity between donors’ agendas and pressure on grantee 
partners to meet expected criteria for campaign and activities. The appeal of 
flexibility, creativity, and dynamism in a social movement is theoretically a conducive 
setting for a feminist collective of activists that seek to challenge the very 
organizational structures that have done little to mobilize an effective constituency for 
women’s rights in Lebanon. 
Activists of Nasawiya are typically between 18-30 years of age and consist of 
women and men of various demographics from throughout Lebanon. The specificity 
in this age range depicts the majority of people in the collective. However, as a social 
movement, Nasawiya often collaborates in protests, campaigns, conferences and 
demonstrations with various groups and organizations that aim to further causes 
through a feminist perspective, too. The notable attraction between Nasawiya and 
young feminist activists in Lebanon is an indication for the need of positions that 
support the emergence of young leaders. Khattab (2010) characterizes the women’s 
movement as previously being an inopportune environment for fresh activism, where 
even leftist woman’s advocacy groups were not particularly interested in mobilizing 
young people in Lebanon: 
“Despite the fact that these associations advanced reformist agendas and challenged 
 104 
the sectarian status quo, their institutional makeup failed to attract young leaders in 
the post-war period. In particular, they were increasingly controlled by a group of 
women who were involved in every aspect of the associational work but refused to 
delegate power to the newer generation.”163 
In comparison to the institutional makeup of other women’s advocacy groups, 
the collective organizational structure relies on support and leadership by every 
member to sustain its flexible, creative, and dynamic movement. Most important, 
Nasawiya is conducive for mobilizing activists on new ideas in campaigns and 
initiatives by young people in Lebanon as a result of receiving funds and grants from 
women’s transnational organizations that which support to establish local feminist 
movements. Commonly referred to by scholars of social movement theory and 
organizational theory as social movement organizations (SMOs), these transnational 
organizations provide seed grants to diffuse a template of activism.164 Before 
Nasawiya, in 2008 18.6% of reported organizations in the region worked with young 
women on women’s rights work. Those organizations that reported a target group of 
young women under thirty-years of age were most cognizant of the need to integrate 
young women’s rights work into their context. Yet, of the surveyed organizations, 
only 49%, less than half admitted to having young women in managerial roles.165  
 To build upon its twenty-one feminist causes and initiate such a challenge to 
the status quo, Nasawiya members engage in women’s issues across the following 
initiatives: Ghayreh 3adtik: Feminist Tools for Change, Sawt Al Niswa, Adventures 
of Salwa, Take Back the Tech, coalitions with KAFA (to protest for the legislation of 
The Law to Protect Women from Family Violence) and Zolah (to promote an Arab 
network of young feminist activists in the MENA region), The Gender Databank, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Khattab, 2010, p. 105 
164 Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005 
165 These statistics were generated by a study produced by the Young Feminist Activism Program with 
AWID in 2008. Titled, “Funding the future of women’s rights: Where is the money for the new 
generation of women’s rights initiatives?” the results were taken from an online global survey of 1032 
global organizations. 
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International Women’s Day, Labor Day, Anti-Racism Movement, Delete Article 522 
campaign, and most recently the Nasawiya Café, an entrepreneurial feminist venture 
to provide a sustainable income for campaigns while reclaiming a space in Beirut for 
feminist activists to congregate in. In my view, each initiative varies in transnational 
ties, but ultimately contributes to diffusing transnational feminism. 
 
5.5 – The Pitfalls of Externalization: The International is Personal  
Nasawiya is not exceptional in that the collective requires external funding, as 
do other women’s advocacy groups in Lebanon. Simultaneously, as mainstream 
women’s advocacy groups have been affected by transnational politics and 
institutional structures, transnational processes have affected Nasawiya as a 
movement. However, the difference between Nasawiya and Lebanon’s civic society 
of women’s advocacy groups lies in their relation towards the state as either “elites” 
or “challengers”, while the former relishes its privileged access, such as funding and 
donor-partnership with the UNFPA, the latter must make do with limited access to 
political change.166 This difference is key to understanding what has come to be 
described as the mainstream women’s movement and the alternative women’s 
movement. Although both movements are arguably a product of the same internalized 
contention—international pressure to institute women’s human rights and to raise a 
culture for gender justice and equality—the alternative women’s movement headed 
by Nasawiya exercises a grassroots approach to externalizing contention at 
organizations with particular interest in mobilizing transnational feminist movements. 
Wherein an unresponsive government refuses to allocate resources to the feminist 
movement, Nasawiya has relied on transnational SMOs to assist in mobilizing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Davis, Mayer, McAdam, Richard & Zald, 2005 
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resources. Thus, the influx of young activists into leadership positions at Nasawiya is 
reflective of a larger, transnational trend to supporting young people in “young 
women’s rights work”.167  
The phenomenon of transnational activism in Nasawiya emerged with the 
influx of external interest to fund young women’s rights movement. The Association 
for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), MamaCash, and the Global Women’s 
Fund (GWF) are prominent supporters for multi-year initiatives.  Multi-year financial 
support through transnational feminist SMOs have allowed for transnational diffusion 
of resources, whether of funding or mobilization structures, for young feminist 
movements in developing countries. In Lebanon, the LBQT community became the 
source of feminist diffusion amongst young activists. LBQT support group Meem 
brought forth a renewed movement for queer and feminist discourse amongst young 
people and initiated conscious raising campaigns for awareness of women’s rights in 
Lebanon, their lack of rights, and the imposed traditional, often patriarchal ideals that 
often dilute women with false notions of liberties, such as the means to drive, wear 
expressive clothing, and attend public spaces along with male counterparts. Much of 
these awareness campaigns have been made possible through funding support from 
external organizations for feminist movement building and with utility of Internet for 
organizing and dissemination of information on movement activities that are 
occurring on the ground. Nasawiya’s transnational structure is heavily maintained and 
connected through the means of electronic communication via Internet social media 
sites. Therefore, the Internet provides a means for diffusing, transmitting, and 
disseminating information and for recruiting national to transnational interest towards 
Nasawiya’s cause.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 The Young Feminist Activism Program with the Association for Women in Development (AWID) 
use this concept to describe the future of women’s rights from the perspective of campaigns undertaken 
by young people and a “new generation of women’s rights initiatives”. 
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5.6 – Nasawiya: A Model for Transnational Feminism      
The phenomenon of Nasawiya is indicative of various factors affecting social 
movement organizing in Lebanon. A notably young generation of fervent activists is 
protesting to become part of national discourse to affect an approach of 
Transformative Justice towards gender based violence and sexual harassment. The 
model of transformative justice is “a means of addressing the way that power and 
privilege, abuse and our own histories of trauma play out in our relationships, 
organizations, activism, and movement-building.”168 This model, originally 
formulated by Generation FIVE, a California-based grassroots movement against 
sexual abuse, stands at the core of activism in Nasawiya. The diffusion of the 
normative value of Transformative Justice is the result of transnational activism 
among feminist movements. Most recently, Nasawiya activists were joined by 
regional MENA coalitions in Amman, Jordan for training to enact grassroots 
campaigns for Transformative Justice in country-specific communities. This 
opportunity came at a time when Lebanon’s mainstream women’s movement has not 
gained traction in legislation. The relevance being that the top-down approach in the 
women’s movement has waned, leaving feminist activists to look for bottom-up 
approaches that allow ‘full potential’ of a community to engage in campaign work 
without the collusion or leverage of a patriarchal state.  
Factors such as the combination of existing grievances in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement and the ripe opportunity structure provided by Generation FIVE to 
mobilize a transnational campaign that seeks to work outside of state systems is the 
basis of Nasawiya’s transnationalism. For activists in Nasawiya’s alternative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 Generation Five. (June 2007). Toward Transformative Justice: A liberatory approach to child sexual 
abuse and other forms of intimate and community violence. Retrieved from 
http://www.generationfive.org/downloads/G5_Toward_Transformative_Justice.pdf 
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women’s movement, it is imperative to work without the Lebanese patriarchal state 
and its affiliates, specifically the NCLW-UNFPA machinery. Transformative Justice 
serves as the framework for activists to engage with communities on social issues 
without distress of the state’s cooptation, as seen with the state’s intrusion on 
Lebanon’s mainstream women’s movement in campaigns for personal status laws and 
women’s rights. 
This chapter argues that the emergence of a feminist, alternative women’s 
movement further exemplifies that women’s status in Lebanon are still sites of 
national contention. However, one of the single grievances, an unresponsive 
government, has led the Nasawiya movement to seek assistance from transnational 
feminist organizations. Yet, these western social movement organizations (SMOs) do 
not have leverage to directly affect transnational policy making, but are rather in the 
business of transnational activism to fund women’s work at a grassroots scale. That is 
to say even alternative feminist SMOs have proven as effectual insofar to assist 
individual activists in social projects. The onus to mobilize grassroots movements 
continues to rest upon the shoulders of social movement organizers.  
To refute a cultural relativist perspective, women in Lebanon are neither in 
better social form than their counterparts in the MENA region, nor can their status be 
compared to the liberties esteemed by developed nation-states. Women in Lebanon 
are simply shorthanded by a patriarchal state, and, as this study has argued, there is a 
multitude of detrimental effects hindering women’s organizing in Lebanon’s women’s 
movement that directly stem from the patriarchal, sectarian state.  
A black or white depiction of women’s status, between liberated and 
oppressed, is a reductionist perspective of the situation in Lebanon. While it does not 
depict the character of women’s movements and organizing in Lebanon, transnational 
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support—be it from the U.N. or alternative means—inevitably risks perpetuating this 
black and white idea that women are collectively one or the either.  
If Nasawiya has proven itself as a social movement, the feminist collective has 
proven to be one of a resistance movement against the patriarchal, sectarian political 
system in Lebanon. Its transnational features are broad, varied, and carry the weight 
to become a model across the MENA region’s women’s movements. As a Lebanese 
feminist activists and coordinator of Nasawiya explains: 
“We understand the fact that many problems are Lebanon-specific, but many 
problems are common to the region. We, as Arab women, face challenges that have 
the same root, and this is why, early this year, many of our members in their 
individual capacity were part of the launching of the Young Arab Feminist 
Network in Cairo. We don’t like how the situation for women in Lebanon is always 
compared to that of women in Saudi Arabia, supposedly saying that women here are 
much better off when they are not even aware of what is happening. So yes, we focus 
on Lebanon, but at the same time, women in other countries are inspired by our work 
and have contacted us. There is a mutual inspiration between women here and those 
in the rest of the region.”169  
 
However, even before Nasawiya may prove as a sustainable model for a feminist 
social movement, activists carry a great challenge to overcome the curse of becoming 
just another fragmented movement in Lebanon. Years after its inception, Nasawiya 
continues to be a grouping of activists who have pronounced experience in activism, 
yet face the challenge of mobilizing and organizing a movement as pronounced as 
their rhetoric. Perhaps the feminist movement can risk dissolution by joining, in 
adjunct with other social movements in Lebanon with grievances as a result of the 
sectarian system. 
 Surely, activists of Nasawiya have experienced personal backlashes in 
organizing within other communities who do not uphold feminist values as a social 
framework (such as the very public sexual harassment offenses within the LGBTQI 
community). However, there is a great consequence to cultivating an impenetrable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 Sara, A. (26, July 2010). Girl power. NOW! Lebanon. Retrieved from 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=189010!
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community within a feminist bubble. Feminism, just as the women’s movement as 
whole, has not generated any historical or sweeping achievements in Lebanon. 
Further, the framework of feminism carries negative connotations for being a 
‘Western’ production, irrelevant or inapplicable, and even a radical paradigm for 
human rights to conservative or traditional societies. In Lebanon, the feminist 
movement needs to outwardly address the bulwarks in society and family life outside 
of the realm of the Internet and largely on the ground in order to create a lasting 
movement for waves of success.  
 
5.7 – Conclusion 
Nasawiya is not outwardly a typical movement of transnational forces. The 
grievances underlying the feminist movement in Lebanon are products of long-
standing contention between the state and women. Yet, the transnational effects 
through greater funding and transnational partnerships with regional and international 
feminist movements have provided Nasawiya as a movement with more support than 
the mainstream women’s movement has allotted it. Nonetheless, as this chapter set 
out to demonstrate, transnational feminism exists within the grassroots community of 
activists. Whether this impetus will garner policy reform is beyond the scope of this 
study. What appears true, however, is that the changing landscape of activism can 
eventually effect change. Yet, as it stands, the implications of transnationalism in the 
women’s movement has served to benefit the NCLW-UNFPA partnership as a 
residual structure of the dominant patriarchal systems between Lebanon’s 
confessional system and the U.N. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 – Summary 
The women’s movement has been at the forefront of civil advocacy since 
before Lebanon’s history as a nation-state. As Weber (2003) and Thompson (2000) 
recollect, women in Lebanon have been an integral faction to initiating social and 
political change since the nation sought sovereignty from the French Mandate.170 
Throughout its colonization up until the present period of the “Arab Spring,” women 
have been adopting newer skills over time to organizing campaigns in Lebanon.  This 
thesis proposes, however, a new and still emerging women’s movement in Lebanon – 
one that has divorced itself from the nationalistic—or, more aptly, the mainstream—
women’s movement. From activism by this faction of feminists, grassroots campaigns 
have shown insight into the pervasive transnational structure of activism for policy 
reform on women’s status, and, secondly, the aspirations to expand policy rapport for 
women’s human rights.  
Yet, Lebanon’s women’s movements are not necessarily fragmented along the 
lines of national versus transnational social organizing. Women in Lebanon ultimately 
want the same ends for policy reform against gender-based violence and women’s 
personal status codes. The means to mobilizing support, however, are the fundamental 
differences between the mainstream women’s movement and the alternative, feminist 
movement. Thus, the women’s movement is not fragmented as a whole, but rather 
bifurcated into two separate movements with similar objectives and vastly differing 
means. Whereas the mainstream movement of civil actors organizes in line with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 Weber, 2003; Thompson, 2000 
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political system, the alternative feminist movement decries the sectarian system as the 
sole offender to women’s welfare in Lebanon, and human rights as a whole.  
For the feminist women’s movement to begin to attain its goals, activists 
would need to neutralize their liberal and anti-sectarian rhetoric to garner more 
support among the lay citizens. But this attempt at reducing anti-sectarian rhetoric has 
proven to (further) subdue and mute women in Lebanon. Although this cycle of 
complacency has historically built the women’s movement in numbers, the meager 
effects from its complacent rhetoric has been met with growing tension and 
grievances for a stronger, more radical women’s movement. Further, to recall the 
fragmented structure within the mainstream women’s movement, its complacency has 
directly alienated and marginalized a generation of women’s rights activists who 
rebuke the organization of a women’s movement along national lines. Yet, when 
male, elite policymakers convince the Lebanese public that women are not educated 
enough to participate in political decision making, they are overlooking the main idea 
and undermining the progress women have made for themselves at the hands of a 
withholding political system. These assertions, whether implicit or overtly stated, are 
detrimental to perpetuating a patriarchal society in Lebanon.  
This thesis argues that the women’s movement is a continual force for 
influencing change on policies towards human rights and women’s rights. But while 
this study does not aim to quantify changes in policy, the analysis of the case of 
Nasawiya sets to prove that a new generation of activism has emerged in Lebanon’s 
grassroots community that may well be more effective in pushing for women’s rights 
in the country. Of Nasawiya, I argue, this generation of activism is appropriately 
identified by the nomenclature of a transnational feminist movement.   
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6.2 – Answering the Thesis Question 
Tarrow (2005) describes that the new character of activism will be concerned 
with borderless campaigns as a product of transnationalism, the latest phenomenon to 
affect relationships among states and civic society. According to Tarrow and other 
social movement and social movement organization theorists, the significance of the 
new transnational activism is its potential as the new political landscape of activism.  
Transnational activism is concerned with changing pervasive social and political 
issues that manifest as a result of modern-day conditions.  This kind of activism is 
spatially oriented in the transnational sphere as an inevitable result of globalization 
and internationalism. Just as these forces have caused modern-day social issues, 
activists have also utilized means of globalization and internationalism to transform 
their adversities into opportunities within a movement organizational structure. Yet, 
the focus is not entirely on organizational structures within social movements, nor is 
the focus solely on activists, but the context of the transnational brings the state back 
into the purview of contention.  
Ultimately, this study aimed to challenge the grounded theory of Tarrow’s 
transnational activism. The example of Lebanon’s women’s movement posed a 
complex yet fruitful example of the ever-changing process of organizing in a state 
affected by transnational forces. If transnationalism exists within Lebanon, then this 
study has proven thus by divulging its effects on the identities of feminist activists, 
the emergence of a new political arena, and the fusing of domestic and international 
politics, especially in the shift of the mainstream women’s movement to international 
heights through the NCLA-UNFPA partnership. Further, the case of Nasawiya has 
inadvertently shown that marginalized groups can profit more from a transnational 
movement than refusing to seek assistance from larger, umbrella social movement 
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organizations. Activists of Nasawiya have outright proven their ability to utilize 
transnational resources for the benefit of mobilizing a strictly national movement. 
Feminists of Nasawiya have broken the stereotype, that of muted feminists, to deafen 
the ears of their antagonists. Whereas, just under ten years ago, Bray-Collins (2003) 
assumed the worst of the women’s movement in Lebanon and reasserted notions that 
“a stronger feminist consciousness” was nowhere in sight to resurrect Lebanon’s 
women’s movement from the deathly grip of elite male policymakers, today, 
Lebanon’s feminist movement is active and diverse due to its transnational support 
from grassroots SMOs and the means of Internet-wide support from Diasporas and 
activists alike. A conscious raising feminist movement is undeniably at force in 
Lebanon and coming in clearer than before. 
However, the implication of challenging the status quo varies ultimately on 
the level of mobility and organization between social factions. The other side of the 
undeniable truth is that women’s issues continue to be second-rate concerns to the 
mainstream public. The very mainstream public further continues to support the 
confessional and clientalistic political system that breeds the patriarchy that stifles 
women’s organizing. In the face of an upcoming electoral year, Lebanon’s 
confessional political system does not show any sign of implosion, and despite 
increase in grievances amongst factions for a secular and democratic system, only 
carrots of reforms are on the menu. Yet, on the cusp of 2013, when geopolitical 
turmoil has heeded more attention than national politics, electoral reforms seem 
distant, far-fetched and unattainable at this time. A longstanding debate to enact an 
electoral quota for women in Parliament at this point seems imaginary. In the 
meantime, the mainstream women’s movement will continue to function under the 
NCLW-UNFPA partnership. At best, the NCLW-UNFPA commission is an artifice to 
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sustain women’s support of the sectarian system. At worst the NCLW-UNFPA stifles 
the women’s movement by design. 
 
6.3 – Lessons and Avenues for Future Research 
The study of transnational activism relies on intrinsic and extrinsic factors of a 
social movement phenomenon. While the feminist movement becomes more visible, 
the study has proven that social movement theories continue to be relevant, especially 
the marriage of social movement and organization theory. These theories were 
applied to investigate the intrinsic factors of Lebanon’s women’s movement, and 
particularly the spur of a feminist movement. The framework of this study follows 
American contemporary social movement theorist (Tarrow, Tilly, McAdam, Doug, 
Skocpol) to identify the central conflicts within the women’s movement that are 1) 
unique to the “Lebanese oddity” in movement organization and 2) and external 
contention that is extrinsic to sustaining the transnational political structure and 
definitive of the “new era” in social movement study.171  
 Where I believe an opening for research has emerged through this study is 
from my observations of the Nasawiya movement in reclaiming public spaces for a 
“counterpublic sphere”. From the Nasawiya Café to virtual feminist web spaces, 
activism in Lebanon’s feminist movement concerns activities beyond demonstrations, 
community-wide events, and international conferences or meetings. The concept of 
the “counterpublic sphere” is most relevant to describing the transnational activism in 
Nasawiya, wherein private and public spaces are reinvented for the primary objective 
to disseminate counter-discourses against the prevailing structures of Lebanon’s civic 
society and its inherent attachment to the sectarian political system. McLaughlin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Crossley, 2002 
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(2004) describes these members as “subordinated social groups” who “within the 
context of a counterpublic…are able to offer interpretations of their identities, needs, 
and interests in opposition to a comprehensive public sphere imbued with dominant 
interests and ideologies.”172 Wherein the Beijing Conference of 1995 set a precedent 
for women’s organizing and a momentum towards transnational movement, the 
transnational feminist movement has taken example of the importance in utilizing 
communication across national borders. In the case of Nasawiya, the transnational 
feminist movement has taken an initiative to adopt political-economic practices into 
its counterpublic space. An inclusion of women and men, regardless of religious 
denominations, nationalities, and persuasions utilize the Nasawiya Café as a 
movement-sustainable project. Surely this space can provide an appealing narrative, 
but its function as a paradigm for non-profit, feminist entrepreneurialism elicits 
interest of further study. Can this paradigm serve as a new formula for a feminist 
political economy in Lebanon?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 McLaughlin, 2004, p. 160; Fraser, 1997, p. 81; Felski, 1989 
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